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This Article assigns a redistributive role to the legal rules of trusts and 
estates. Unlike business law, trusts and estates law has lagged in 
articulating a comprehensive theory on inequality. Consequently, 
income inequality is compounded intergenerationally as wealth
inequality, with dire consequences for economic productivity and social 
stability. To move the discourse on wealth inequality, this Article 
explores the divergent approaches toward inequality in business law 
and trusts and estates.
Additionally, this Article recasts trusts and estates’ legal rules as wealth 
transfer mechanisms. Four categories of rules are implicated: (1) rules 
that interact with the tax system, (2) rules that govern relations between 
beneficiaries and creditors, (3) rules that govern relations between 
beneficiaries and trustees, and (4) rules that govern relations among 
beneficiaries.
More broadly, this Article contributes to three lines of scholarly 
debates. The first revolves around the propriety of drawing analogies 
between trust law and the law of enterprise organization. The second is 
whether legal rules or the tax system better effectuate redistribution. 
The third is whether legal rules should reflect our notions of fairness or 
welfare.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the law on the transmission of wealth (i.e., trusts and estates) has 
been insulated from the pushback against inequality sweeping through the laws 
governing the generation of wealth (e.g., business law). In recent years, 
corporate law has advanced a team production theory of the firm and sought to 
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rein in executive compensation,1 while antitrust has debated the ties between 
market power and inequality.2 Trusts and estates law, meanwhile, has confined 
this discourse primarily to the estate tax and, to a lesser extent, a handful of 
issues such as dynasty trusts, spendthrift and asset protection trusts, and intestate 
succession.3 For the most part, however, trusts and estates law has lacked a 
coherent and unifying approach toward inequality.4
This is not surprising. The generation of wealth is a team effort where 
multiple constituencies might have played a role—and therefore can stake a 
claim—in the output. Hence, arguments for pay equity have some moral force. 
By contrast, when a donor gratuitously transfers wealth, the donees might be 
unborn parties who did not contribute to the donor’s accumulation of wealth. 
Here the law tends to defer to the preferences of donors (i.e., testators and 
settlors), displacing those preferences only under limited circumstances.5 This 
tendency is reinforced by social norms toward diligence and success that enable 
dead hand control.6
Nonetheless, this deficiency in trusts and estates law has left wealth
inequality with little redress. In fact, the wealth gap is even larger than the 
income gap and has been steadily growing,7 with dire consequences for society.8
Inequality hampers economic growth, thwarts democracy, erodes public health, 
                                                                                                                     
1 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21 (2017) (requiring shareholder approval of executive 
compensation); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 323–24 (1999) (seminal work on team production 
theory).
2 See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
1171, 1173 (2016).
3 See Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate Tax 
To Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255, 1256 (2013); 
Susan F. French, Perpetual Trusts, Conservation Servitudes, and the Problem of the Future,
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2523, 2526 (2006); Palma Joy Strand, Inheriting Inequality: Wealth, 
Race, and the Laws of Succession, 89 OR. L. REV. 453, 457 (2010); Reid Kress Weisbord, 
Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 884, 924 
(2012).
4 Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti, A Critical Research Agenda for Wills, 
Trusts, and Estates, 49 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 317, 340 (2014).
5 For a summary, see Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante 
Versus Ex Post Justifications, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1137–38 (2013).
6 For a summary, see Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of 
the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 6–8 (1992). On the centrality of freedom of testation in 
American succession law, see RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING 
POWER OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 6–7 (2010). On the evolution of the term “dead hand 
control,” see Daniel B. Kelly, Trust Term Extension: An Economic Analysis, 67 FLA. L. REV.
F. 85, 87–88 (2015).
7 On the distinction between wealth inequality and income inequality, see Strand, 
supra note 3, at 458–59.
8 For a summary of the literature, see James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and 
Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825, 831–49 (2001).
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and foments social instability, political unrest, and racial injustice.9 Inequality 
is firmly entrenched and self-perpetuating.10 Its many distortionary effects are 
both a cause and a symptom of the concentration of economic and political 
power in the hands of the very few at the expense of the great many.
To provoke discourse on wealth inequality within trusts and estates, this 
Article compares the law’s treatment toward the generation versus the 
dissemination of wealth and advances a vision that integrates these two 
components. The Article analogizes the laws governing wealth to a unified 
system, where localized imperfections can raise inequality unless corrected 
elsewhere.11 For instance, in corporate law, a singular devotion to shareholder 
primacy spurs income inequality, which in turn compounds wealth inequality 
when the estate tax fails to arrest the velocity of disparity over several 
generations.
In taking the first steps toward a unifying theory on inequality, this Article 
focuses on non-tax aspects of trusts and estates. Currently, the principal 
mechanism of redistribution in trusts and estates is the tax system. However, as 
a matter of political reality, the estate tax simply has too little traction—and, in 
the current political climate, is likely to be repealed.12 As a matter of broader 
academic trends, examining the redistributive propensity of other areas within 
trusts and estates mirrors similar conversations in antitrust, corporate law, and 
financial regulation that are all occurring outside the ambit of tax policy.
Assigning a redistributive role to trusts and estates can be controversial,13
but this Article presents a roadmap for working through potential pitfalls. As an 
initial step, we can define “redistribution” as a reduction in income or wealth 
inequality.14 Next, we should note that redistribution is most efficiently 
                                                                                                                     
9 See infra Part II.B.2.
10 For a powerful rendition of the correlation between inequality and intergenerational 
economic mobility, see Miles Corak, Income Inequality, Equality of Opportunity, and 
Intergenerational Mobility, 27 J. ECON. PERSP. 79, 82 fig.1 (2013). This graphic has come 
to be known as the “Great Gatsby Curve.” See Alan B. Krueger, Chairman, Council of Econ. 
Advisers, The Rise and Consequences of Inequality in the United States 4 (Jan. 12, 2012),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/krueger_cap_speech_final_remarks.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8QRS-K3KB].
11 See Ronen Avraham et al., Revisiting the Roles of Legal Rules and Tax Rules in 
Income Redistribution: A Response to Kaplow & Shavell, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1125, 1126 
(2004) (arguing that redistributive goals are better accomplished on a case-by-case basis).
12 See Brian J. O’Connor, Once Again, the Estate Tax May Die, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/18/your-money/taxes/once-again-the-estate-tax-
may-die.html?partner=bloomberg (on file with Ohio State Law Journal); see also MICHAEL 
J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING 
INHERITED WEALTH (2005); infra Part II.B.
13 See infra Part II.A.
14 This is the general understanding in economics. See, e.g., PETER J. LAMBERT, THE 
DISTRIBUTION AND REDISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 37–39 (3d ed., Manchester Univ. Press
2001) (1989).
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accomplished when there is a transfer from the rich to the poor. Scholars 
disagree on whether legal rules or the tax system can better effectuate this 
transfer.15 With due consideration to that debate, this Article examines the 
redistributive propensities of trusts and estates’ legal rules—specifically, the 
rules most likely to govern interactions between rich and poor players. Here the 
analogy to business law loses its force. Whereas a variety of players from 
different stations come together to generate wealth, the gratuitous transfer of 
wealth tends to involve families or other units that are likely to be more 
economically uniform.
To advance the discussion on how trusts and estates can redistribute wealth, 
this Article examines four subsets of legal rules: (1) rules that interact with the 
tax-and-transfer system (e.g., the rule against perpetuities), (2) rules that govern 
relations between grantors and beneficiaries on the one hand and creditors on 
the other (e.g., spendthrift and asset protection trusts), (3) rules that govern 
relations between beneficiaries and trustees (e.g., fiduciary duties), and (4) rules 
that govern relations among beneficiaries (e.g., abatement, ademption, cy pres,
and execution formalities). The thrust of this exercise is to infuse this field’s
dialogue on redistribution with theoretical frameworks from law and 
economics.16
Counterarguments abound. For example, legal rules which redistribute 
wealth might add to distortions in the tax system—the so-called “double 
distortion” argument.17 Within trusts and estates, adherence to efficiency (or, 
more precisely, welfare) over testator or settlor intent is particularly
                                                                                                                     
15 See, e.g., Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth, On the Limits of Redistributive 
Taxation: Establishing a Case for Equity-Informed Legal Rules, 25 VA. TAX REV. 1, 2 
(2005); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor? Clarifying the 
Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 821,
822–23 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Favor the Poor?]; Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing 
Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 667 (1994) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient]; 
Chris William Sanchirico, Deconstructing the New Efficiency Rationale, 86 CORNELL L.
REV. 1003, 1006–09 (2001).
16 Recent works in this vein include Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Distributive Justice and 
Donative Intent, 65 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), and Mark Glover, A Social Welfare 
Theory of Inheritance Regulation, 2018 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming).
17 The “double distortion” argument in law economics holds that a rule which 
redistributes income only adds to the economic distortions already present in the tax system. 
See Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 15, at 667–68. For instance, taxes cause 
labor–leisure distortions: an individual taxed at a 40% rate will find work to be less attractive 
than leisure and will work less. David A. Weisbach, Essay, Should Legal Rules Be Used To
Redistribute Income?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 440–41 (2003). When a legal rule becomes a 
vehicle for redistribution—for example, if wealthy tortfeasors have to pay greater damages 
than poor tortfeasors—there is both the labor–leisure distortion and a distortion relative to 
the rule. Individuals might “take too much or too little care, breach contracts inappropriately, 
under- or over-invest in property, and so on.” Id. at 447. For a fuller discussion, see infra
notes 127–35 and accompanying text. 
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controversial.18 Additionally, excessive tinkering with testamentary instruments 
might drive trusts offshore or toward other favorable jurisdictions.19 Finally, 
viewing the laws governing generation and transmission of wealth as a closed 
system may violate economic principles on how wealth moves.20 This Article 
addresses each criticism in turn.
Part II of this Article dissects the asymmetrical approaches of business law 
and trusts and estates toward inequality. Part III recasts trusts and estates’ legal 
rules as wealth transfer mechanisms. Part IV advances a framework for applying 
these rules to serve distributive ends. Here the governing principles will be (1) 
the management of spillover effects between rules governing the transmission 
of wealth and rules governing the generation of wealth, (2) the proper balance 
between the goals of fairness and welfare, and (3) maximizing distributive 
efficiency.
II. ASYMMETRICAL APPROACHES TOWARD INEQUALITY
Laws governing the generation of wealth are infused with principles that 
can redress inequality. However, as currently conceived, laws governing the 
transmission of wealth are poorly suited to tackle inequality and, in fact, can 
exacerbate it. This Part introduces the conundrum by citing examples from 
corporate law, antitrust law, and financial regulation, in contradistinction to 
trusts and estates. This Part then examines the consequences of the asymmetry.
A. Generation Versus Transmission of Wealth
In recent years, corporate law scholars have challenged shareholder 
primacy, the notion that corporations exist to serve the interests of 
shareholders.21 As one argument goes, shareholder primacy fetishizes 
shareholder profits, particularly short-term profits, to the detriment of all other 
constituencies.22 Large, activist shareholders such as hedge funds might spur a 
firm to cut its way to profitability by laying off employees; then those large 
                                                                                                                     
18 See Kelly, supra note 5; Lee-Ford Tritt, The Limitations of an Economic Agency Cost 
Theory of Trust Law, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2579, 2589 (2011). Welfare is the aggregation of 
every individual’s well-being in a society. MARC FLEURBAEY & FRANÇOIS MANIQUET, A
THEORY OF FAIRNESS AND SOCIAL WELFARE 234 (2011); LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN 
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 38–41 (2002). Efficiency means wealth 
maximization, but in legal scholarship, it has become an amorphous concept unmoored from 
its roots in well-being. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra, at 41; see also infra Part IV.B.
19 See Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1048–50 (2000).
20 See infra Part II.B.1.
21 For the roots of shareholder primacy, see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
22 See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 776–78 (2005).
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shareholders might sell their stake before the grave consequences of their 
strategy set in. In response, some academics have refined the primacy norm to 
argue that directors (not shareholders) enjoy primacy,23 while others have gone 
a step further by arguing that the corporate conception must account for 
employees.24 In a notable opinion, the Delaware Chancery Court even 
speculated whether fiduciary obligations should extend to the corporate 
enterprise as a whole, including creditors, when a firm is “in the vicinity of 
insolvency.”25 At their core, such positions reorient the principal–agent 
relationship, which forms the bedrock of fiduciary duty, away from the focal 
point of the shareholder. This reorientation works to equalize incomes, by 
directing agents to consider more than shareholder profits in the operation of a 
corporation.26
This is not to say that shareholder primacy always impedes income equality. 
Corporate reforms eliminating staggered boards, reining in executive 
compensation, and inhibiting boards from vetoing takeover bids are all 
pro-shareholder. These reforms limit the ability of executives and board 
members to steer compensation and also to entrench themselves at the expense 
of shareholder value. If the quintessential manager is a highly paid executive 
and the quintessential shareholder is an ordinary investor, then these reforms 
work to level out incomes.
Competition policy, too, has recently assumed the mantle of redressing 
inequality. Since the start of the financial crisis, legal scholars have debated the 
role of antitrust in enabling financial firms to attain systemic significance.27
Now economists have entered the fray to argue that monopoly regressivity is a 
root cause of inequality.28 Altogether, these developments challenge the 
Chicago School paradigm, whose central focus in the design and enforcement 
of regulation is efficiency. When the goal of antitrust rules is broadened beyond 
                                                                                                                     
23 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 17, 18 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012); 
Blair & Stout, supra note 1, at 320–21.
24 Matthew T. Bodie, Income Inequality and Corporate Structure, 45 STETSON L. REV.
69, 70 (2015).
25 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., No. 12150, 1991 
WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
26 This has even led to a movement to explore new corporate forms to accommodate 
social entrepreneurship. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., Making It Easier for Directors To “Do the 
Right Thing”?, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 235, 249–50 (2014).
27 See, e.g., Alan Devlin, Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 557, 558 (2010).
28 See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 444 (Arthur 
Goldhammer trans., 2014); ROBERT B. REICH, SAVING CAPITALISM 29–47 (2015); JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ, THE GREAT DIVIDE: UNEQUAL SOCIETIES AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT THEM 
84–85 (2015); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY (2012) [hereinafter STIGLITZ,
PRICE OF INEQUALITY]. But see Crane, supra note 2, at 1174 (arguing that monopoly power 
does not have a substantial connection to wealth inequality).
80 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 79:1
efficiency to include equity and redistribution, inequality diminishes.29 For 
example, a rule that prevents dominant firms from merging ends up ceding 
market share—and, therefore, wealth—to smaller rivals.30 So, too, does a rule 
that prevents a monopoly from engaging in predatory pricing to drive out its 
smaller rivals.31
Rules governing the generation of wealth are not just administered by 
courts; they are also administered by regulators. For instance, competitors can 
sue under federal and state antitrust laws, but the Department of Justice and 
Federal Trade Commission play prominent roles in intermediating transactions 
among competitors (e.g., by blocking mergers, which transfers wealth from 
merging parties to other market players) or between firms and consumers (e.g., 
by prohibiting deceptive sales practices or supracompetitive pricing, which 
transfers wealth from regulated firms to consumers). In fact, business law now 
interfaces as much with public law as with private law, due to the proliferation 
of regulations governing business operations. Thus, financial reform legislation 
has interposed administrative agencies onto a host of business–consumer 
interactions that used to be conceived as purely contractual.32 Even a 
traditionally “private” law matter such as the enforcement of fiduciary duty, 
customarily between private parties before a court, has been made “public” in 
several settings.33 Redistribution under legal rules governing business is 
therefore occurring frequently within the regulatory ambit. To the extent that 
regulators have more information at their disposal than courts in administering 
a legal rule, the regulatory turn is a welcome evolution; for regulators can give 
redistribution maximum effect, while achieving both uniformity and 
efficiency.34
                                                                                                                     
29 Of course, antitrust is concerned with various types of efficiency, and efficiency does 
not necessarily exclude equality; however, sometimes efficiency counsels against 
enforcement. Here I am simply tracing the literature that calls for more aggressive 
competition policy, beyond efficiency’s traditional strictures, to mitigate economic 
inequality. See generally Strine, supra note 26.
30 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
31 Id. § 2.
32 See The Bureau, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.
gov/about-us/the-bureau/ [https://perma.cc/ZX3Z-NTFT].
33 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 23.400–23.451 (2017) (imposing business conduct standards 
for swap dealers in certain derivatives sales); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON 
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 108–11 (Jan. 2011) (recommending uniform
fiduciary duties for broker-dealers). Recently, however, the viability of the fiduciary rule for 
broker-dealers has come into question. See Ben Protess & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Trump 
Moves To Roll Back Obama-Era Financial Regulations, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/03/business/dealbook/trump-congress-financial-regulations.
html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
34 This reasoning animated a pair of Supreme Court cases requiring antitrust to yield to 
regulation in the event of overlap. See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 
264, 281–82 (2007); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 
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In the transmission of wealth, however, redistribution unfolds very 
differently. To be sure, scholars have tried to lay the groundwork for trusts and 
estates to redress inequality. Professor Ascher’s article, Curtailing Inherited 
Wealth, argues that all property owned by a decedent should be sold and the 
proceeds turned over to the government, subject to certain exceptions and the 
payment of debts and expenses.35 Recently, with the attention on societal 
inequality, academics have called for the wealth transfer taxes to be bolstered 
and, more fundamentally, a critical trusts and estates research agenda to 
incorporate the voices of disempowered groups.36 In this vein, Professor 
Weisbord has proposed ways for Americans—especially the poor—to avoid 
intestacy so as to maintain intergenerational economic continuity.37 At the other 
end of the economic spectrum, scholars have assailed dynasty trusts and asset 
protection trusts, which lock away the wealth of the very rich.38 All of these 
proposals, however, suffer from practical and normative deficiencies.
As a practical matter, once wealth has been accumulated during a testator’s
lifetime, the principal mechanism of redistribution is the tax system: estate taxes 
(on the donor’s estate) and inheritance taxes (on recipients). Yet over the last 
few decades, these taxes have been eviscerated. Where once an estate tax rate 
in excess of 77% (beyond a $40,000 exemption) stood, now a rate of 35% (and 
an exemption of $5 million) wobbles.39 Nonetheless, given recurring appeals to 
resuscitate the estate tax, academics seem not to have yet accepted the political 
reality that the rollback on this tax is here to stay and the repeal imminent.40
The natural alternative is to look to the myriad of legal rules within trusts 
and estates. This move, too, is fraught with practical difficulties. Unlike business 
law, trusts and estates law rarely interfaces with regulators. Occasionally a state 
attorney general might intervene in the administration of a charitable trust if 
there are allegations of fraud or misuse of trust assets, but of course, someone 
                                                                                                                     
398, 411 (2004). For criticisms, see Howard A. Shelanski, The Case for Rebalancing 
Antitrust and Regulation, 109 MICH. L. REV. 683 (2011).
35 Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 73 (1990).
36 See Caron & Repetti, supra note 3, at 1256; Crawford & Infanti, supra note 4, at 343; 
Repetti, supra note 8, at 831–49 (canvassing the literature on estate, gift, and income tax 
arguments).
37 See Weisbord, supra note 3, at 880–81.
38 See French, supra note 3, at 2526; Adam S. Hofri-Winogradow, The Stripping of the 
Trust: From Evolutionary Scripts to Distributive Results, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 529, 531 (2014).
39 For a concise history of this evolution, see Jay A. Soled & Mitchell M. Gans, Asset 
Preservation and the Evolving Role of Trusts in the Twenty-First Century, 72 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 257, 262–72 (2015). On the coalition that fought estate taxes, see GRAETZ &
SHAPIRO, supra note 12, at 154–67.
40 See, e.g., Caron & Repetti, supra note 3, at 1256–57; see also Ashlea Ebeling, Will 
Trump Victory Yield Estate Tax Repeal?, FORBES (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/ashleaebeling/2016/11/09/will-trump-victory-yield-estate-tax-repeal/#3dadd65f528a 
[https://perma.cc/V9VH-8JW8]; O’Connor, supra note 12.
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must first alert the attorney general.41 Where trusts and estates law intersects 
with Medicaid, Medicare, Social Security, and housing programs, there is some 
regulatory oversight,42 but the legal rules implicated tend not to touch upon the 
core attributes of redistribution explored above: a transfer of wealth from rich 
to poor, ideally by a regulator that can gauge the macroeconomic effects of its 
intervention. In trusts and estates, redistribution by rules would seem to be 
consigned to trust litigation and probate proceedings, which is altogether more 
ramshackle.43
Yet there are redeeming features in trusts and estates’ legal rules. When 
courts construe those rules, notions of equity and fairness are often at play. 
Courts can either emphasize or dispense with will formalities and other rules to 
arrive at results that protect a testator’s surviving family members.44 In this way, 
trusts and estates law mirrors the enforcement of corporate law, particularly 
fiduciary duty, where courts often stretch to get to a “fair” result that runs 
counter to black letter law.45 Hence, redistribution might be meted out in small 
doses, between parties to a judicial proceeding, but it is redistribution 
nonetheless.
As a normative matter, however, assigning a redistributive role to trusts and 
estates’ legal rules violates dearly held values that are peculiar to the field. 
Freedom of testation is the “organizing principle of the American law of 
donative transfers.”46 The notion that a testator or settlor, having amassed 
wealth during his lifetime, enjoys the discretion to control its disposition is 
deeply ingrained in American society. It is so ingrained, in fact, that many 
Americans reflexively endorse limits on the government’s ability to tax 
                                                                                                                     
41 See, e.g., N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., About the Charities Bureau,
CHARITIESNYS.COM, https://www.charitiesnys.com/about_new.html [https://perma.cc/9E3W-
KW4W]; Office of the Attorney Gen. of Ca., Charities, CAL. DEP’T JUST.,
https://oag.ca.gov/charities [https://perma.cc/DZ7D-NB6G].
42 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c) (2012); see also Joel C. Dobris, Medicaid Asset 
Planning by the Elderly: A Policy View of Expectations, Entitlement and Inheritance, 24 
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 7 (1989).
43 For now, this Article will sidestep the critique of haphazardness from one-off 
lawsuits, addressing it more in depth in Parts III.B.3 and IV.C.
44 Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 235–
36 (1996).
45 This is why the classic fiduciary duty cases are often so difficult to teach. See, e.g.,
Page v. Page, 359 P.2d 41 (Cal. 1961) (en banc) (finding that even though a majority partner 
could have cut out the minority partner, the partner was still bound by the amorphous duty 
of good faith and fair dealing in doing so); Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 549 (N.Y. 
1928) (imposing a remedy that required the breaching party to share a future opportunity—
and therefore continue to do business—with the aggrieved party even after the termination 
of their joint venture). These analyses often conflate fairness with welfare. In Part IV.B, I 
will attempt to untangle these concepts.
46 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. 
a (AM. LAW INST. 2003); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of 
Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 643 (2014).
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inherited wealth.47 For scholars, calls to curtail dead hand control encounters 
equally passionate opposition premised upon freedom of testation—often at the 
expense of tailored discussions over why dead hand control holds any normative 
significance.48
Another normative obstacle is the fact that unlike the creation of wealth, 
which tends to involve numerous and diverse parties, the transmission of wealth 
implicates fewer parties, who are often economically uniform. Wealth 
generation is the interplay of diverse intra-firm constituents ranging from 
executives to part-time service workers, as well as extra-firm diversity of 
producers varying in degree of specialization and market share. Any of these 
constituents might have an equitable claim to a specific party’s wealth. The 
transmission of wealth, by contrast, occurs within a much smaller orbit—
typically within a family or other similar unit, where the members with an 
equitable claim to the testator or settlor’s wealth are few.49 There are some 
exceptions. Creditor claims cut across trusts and estates law just as they do 
business law. But for the most part, the law surrounding the transmission of 
wealth faces much different normative and practical realities than the law 
surrounding the generation of wealth, differences that complicate the 
redistribution proposition for trusts and estates’ legal rules.
Why, then, should these rules take on the redistribution mantle? Simply put, 
wealth inequality is too complex and too socially destructive a problem. The 
current scheme of income redistribution (that is, redistribution at the wealth-
generation end) and weak wealth transfer taxes cannot adequately curb 
inequality. The patchwork of trusts and estates’ legal rules must work to fill the 
cavernous gaps at the wealth transmission end. The next Subpart addresses the 
magnitude of the problem, and the remaining Parts of the Article explore and 
defend the potential solutions.
                                                                                                                     
47 See Louis Kaplow, A Framework for Assessing Estate and Gift Taxation, in 
RETHINKING ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 164, 194 (William G. Gale et al. eds., 2001) 
(“[S]uch factors may help to explain why estate and gift taxation is unpopular among 
individuals who are unlikely ever to have to pay the tax.”).
48 See, e.g., Hirsch & Wang, supra note 6, at 5 (“[L]egal regulation of future interests 
may well require more precise calibration according to the attributes of control which 
testators seek to retain in any given case.”); Kelly, supra note 6, at 89 (“[S]aying that a 
doctrine may increase (or decrease) dead hand control does not have any normative 
significance. Although many scholars assume that dead hand control is bad, asserting that a 
legal reform may involve dead hand control does not tell us anything about whether or not 
the reform is socially desirable.”).
49 See Mark L. Ascher, But I Thought the Earth Belonged to the Living, 89 TEX. L. REV.
1149, 1160 (2011) (book review) (“In most cases . . . children at least knew their parents. 
Maybe, even, in a miniscule number of instances, they contributed to a parent’s acquisition 
of property. Grandchildren, too, generally knew their grandparents to at least some extent. 
But what about great-grandchildren? And great-great grandchildren?”).
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B. Wealth Inequality
1. Conceptualizing Wealth as a System
In recent years, academic and policy attention has been lavished on income 
inequality.50 However, wealth is a more holistic assessment of inequality than 
income.51 Income is the earnings of an individual over a specific period, but 
wealth represents accumulated assets, typically by families and across 
generations.52 For instance, wealth accrues when decedents pass on their assets 
to family members; in turn, those family members may pass on the unused 
portions of inherited assets to their own beneficiaries.
Because wealth is compounded across generations and within families, it 
amplifies socioeconomic gaps.53 Not only do the poor earn less during their 
lifetimes to pass on to survivors than do the rich, the poor may have begun life 
with less advantage, being born to parents who inherited little and likely passed 
on little.54 Not surprisingly, wealth gap is greater than income gap; also, not 
surprisingly, the wealth gap tracks racial disparities.55
Wealth can be construed as a system comprised of two spheres: wealth 
generation and wealth transmission. Similarly, the legal system governing 
wealth can be broken down into laws governing wealth generation and laws 
governing wealth transmission. To draw the analogy further, we can even depict 
this as a unified system, where wealth shifts in response to laws.56 Thus, 
                                                                                                                     
50 E.g., BRANKO MILANOVIC, INCOME, INEQUALITY, AND POVERTY DURING THE 
TRANSITION FROM PLANNED TO MARKET ECONOMY (1998); RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT 
LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY 8–9 (2010). In 
2016, income inequality was a centerpiece of the U.S. presidential election and the United 
Kingdom’s referendum to leave the European Union.
51 STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY, supra note 28, at 2 (“Income inequality data offer 
only a snapshot of an economy at a single moment in time. But this is precisely why the data 
on wealth inequality are so troubling—wealth inequality goes beyond the variations seen in 
year-to-year income. Moreover, wealth gives a better picture of differences in access to 
resources.”).
52 Strand, supra note 3, at 464–65.
53 See Corak, supra note 10, at 80–82.
54 Such is the luck of birth. See MADOFF, supra note 6, at 68; ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY 
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 363 (Edwin Cannan ed.,
Random House 1937) (1776) (“[I]n . . . Europe . . . nothing can be more completely absurd. 
[Fee tails] are founded upon the most absurd of all suppositions . . . that every successive 
generation of men have not an equal right to the earth, . . . but that the property of the present 
generation should be restrained and regulated according to the fancy of those who died 
perhaps five hundred years ago.”).
55 Strand, supra note 3, at 466–68.
56 This is akin to a thermodynamic system. However, the First Law of Thermodynamics 
states that in a closed system, energy is neither created nor destroyed. Thus, at some point 
the analogy to thermodynamics breaks down because unlike energy, wealth is not necessarily 
a zero-sum game in a closed system. See infra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
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imperfections in one sphere may augment overall imperfection in the system 
unless corrected elsewhere. 
As a concrete example, assume that a dominant entertainment conglomerate 
has built up market power by conspiring to exclude smaller rivals in the initial 
screening of films or by forcing cable companies to bundle less desirable 
channels with popular channels.57 The majority of stock in the conglomerate is 
owned and controlled by its chief executive.58 During his lifetime, the executive 
is vastly wealthier than any of his firm’s employees. If his succession plan 
transfers his ownership stake to trusts managed on behalf of five of his 
grandchildren, then at the next generation, when the wealth held by those five 
beneficiaries is compared against the wealth held by all the successors of all of 
the firm’s employees, wealth disparity will likely be even greater simply 
because there are proportionately more successors of firm employees than 
successors of the executive.
Of course, wealth disparity can be fixed with robust estate, inheritance, and 
gift taxes. However, if wealth transfer taxes are feeble, then the velocity of 
disparity will accelerate from one generation to the next. Assume, for instance, 
that a corporation which operates discount retail and grocery stores maximizes 
profitability by paying its employees extremely low (and perhaps 
discriminatory) wages,59 selling products manufactured in countries with low 
labor and environmental protection standards,60 and bribing government 
officials abroad to expedite construction permits.61 The founder accumulates so 
much wealth that his heirs become the richest family in the country.62 Six of the 
heirs wield more wealth than the bottom 42% of all Americans combined, a 
proportion that has increased with time.63 The heirs might avoid or minimize 
                                                                                                                     
57 See Shalini Ramachandran & Merissa Marr, New Attack on TV ‘Bundles,’ WALL ST.
J. (Feb. 26, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732388430457832
8261904851932 (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
58 See About National Amusements, NAT’L AMUSEMENTS, https://www.national
amusements.com/ [https://perma.cc/93RH-KUKE]; Keach Hagey & Joe Flint, Sumner 
Redstone’s National Amusements To Call on Viacom and CBS To Explore Merger, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sumner-redstones-national-
amusements-to-call-on-viacom-and-cbs-to-explore-merger-1475077902 (on file with Ohio 
State Law Journal).
59 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 342–43 (2011).
60 See S. Prakash Sethi, The World of Wal-Mart, CARNEGIE COUNCIL (May 8, 2013), 
http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/ethics_online/0081 [https://perma.cc/ML8K-
HWGG].
61 See David Barstow & Alejandra Xanic von Bertrab, The Bribery Aisle: How Wal-
Mart Used Payoffs to Get Its Way in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2012, at A1.
62 Walton Family, FORBES (June 29, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/profile/walton-1/
[https://perma.cc/9MJ9-9WWB].
63 See Josh Harkinson, Chart: 6 Walmart Heirs Hold More Wealth than 42% of 
Americans Combined, MOTHER JONES (July 18, 2012),
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/07/
walmart-heirs-waltons-wealth-income-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/A5DF-532D].
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estate taxes by utilizing grantor retained annuity trusts (GRATs), where a 
grantor is paid an annuity for a fixed period and any money left over passes to 
his heirs tax free, and charitable lead annuity trusts (CLATs), where payments 
are made to a charity for a fixed period and any money remaining passes to heirs 
with minimal taxes.64 These GRATs and CLATs, borne of generous tax 
loopholes, enable the heirs to pass on billions of dollars in assets virtually tax
free generation after generation, exacerbating wealth inequality.65
Admittedly, the unified wealth model is simplistic. It omits an important 
qualification: no system is completely closed. Wealth flows into and out of 
countries, either legally or illicitly.66 After all, the cross-border movement of 
wealth forms the foundation for international trade, as well as cottage industries 
exploiting arbitrage opportunities.67 Wealth is simply not created or transmitted 
in confined economies.68 Yet a unified model can still be a useful way of 
thinking through legal rules, by disassembling the legal system into a set of laws 
governing the generation of wealth and another set governing the transmission 
of wealth. When one set spurs concentration in wealth and the other does 
nothing to reduce it, concentration will continue unabated.
2. Effects of Wealth Inequality
The effects of wealth concentration tend to manifest over a long period, 
which impedes sustained study.69 For many decades, hypotheses abounded on 
the trajectories of inequality, but substantiation was difficult.70 Yet our tools for 
                                                                                                                     
64 See Kent C. Kiffner, Note, Charitable Remainder Annuity Trusts: Why the Internal 
Revenue Service’s Approach Needs Revision, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 739, 754 (2004); How 
To Preserve a Family Fortune Through Tax Tricks, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 12, 2013),
https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/infographics/how-to-preserve-a-family-fortune-through-tax-
tricks.html [https://perma.cc/KPE6-FCCE]; Zachary R. Mider, How Wal-Mart’s Waltons 
Maintain Their Billionaire Fortune with Estate Taxes, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 13, 2013),
https://www.accountingtoday.com/news/how-wal-marts-waltons-maintain-their-billionaire-
fortune-with-estate-taxes?regconf=1 [https://perma.cc/SKX5-8BZY].
65 See Mider, supra note 64.
66 Just as wealth is distributed unevenly within a country, its distribution is also uneven 
among countries. See BRANKO MILANOVIC, WORLDS APART: MEASURING INTERNATIONAL 
AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY 39–44 (2005). In fact, these disparities are the root of outsourcing.
67 See Sterk, supra note 19, at 1048–50; Reid K. Weisbord, A Catharsis for U.S. Trust 
Law: American Reflections on the Panama Papers, 116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 93, 99 
(2016).
68 Indeed, wealth flows to the jurisdictions that regulate its transmission the most 
lightly. See Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust 
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 359 (2005); 
Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition To Abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities: R.I.P. 
for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2098 (2003).
69 See PIKETTY, supra note 28, at 164–68; Repetti, supra note 8, at 835–36.
70 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 35
(1999) (hypothesizing that inequality is a product of the failure to invest in education); 
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gauging inequality have steadily become more sophisticated.71 We can say with 
confidence and precision that inequality has grown at an alarming clip in recent 
decades, a trend that has only accelerated since the financial crisis.72 In fact, our 
country is more economically unequal today than at any point since the Great 
Depression.73 Along with advances in measuring inequality, our alarm over 
inequality has intensified. Inequality hampers economic growth, but there are 
spillover effects into every other imaginable sphere of life—democracy, public 
health, education, and social stability. 
A consensus of empirical evidence shows that the more concentrated an 
economy is, the lower its growth rate.74 Inequality constitutes such a formidable 
                                                                                                                     
MILANOVIC, supra note 50 (presenting case study of inequality during the instability of post-
Communist transition in Eastern Europe); Alberto Alesina & Dani Rodrik, Distribution, 
Political Conflict and Economic Growth: A Simple Theory and Some Empirical Evidence,
in POLITICAL ECONOMY, GROWTH, AND BUSINESS CYCLES 23, 34 (Alex Cukierman et al. 
eds., 1992) (hypothesizing that inequality results from high taxes on the wealthy, which 
discourages investment and impairs growth); Charles B. Garrison & Feng-Yao Lee, 
Taxation, Aggregate Activity and Economic Growth: Further Cross-Country Evidence on 
Some Supply-Side Hypotheses, 30 ECON. INQUIRY 172, 173–73 (1992) (challenging the 
Alesina & Rodrik hypothesis); Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality,
45 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 7–8 (1955) (hypothesizing that inequality tracks the progression of an 
economy from rural to industrial); Roberto Perotti, Growth, Income Distribution, and 
Democracy: What the Data Say, 1 J. ECON. GROWTH 149, 152 (1996) (hypothesizing that 
inequality both causes and results from sociopolitical instability).
71 One recent work to garner acclaim is PIKETTY, supra note 28. Piketty and his 
colleagues managed to create a comprehensive picture of wealth distribution by 
supplementing census and other survey data with tax data. Through this compilation, they 
concluded that two factors dictate the composition of wealth—capital and income—and the 
current wealth gap is attributed to stagnant incomes for most of the economy and a relative 
explosion in the value of capital held by those at the top. For one of the many reviews of 
Piketty’s work, see Paul Krugman, Why We’re in a New Gilded Age, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (May 
8, 2014), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/05/08/thomas-piketty-new-gilded-age/
[https://perma.cc/ME2Z-PR2F]. Another prominent figure is the economist Angus Deaton, 
who devoted his career to refining the measurement of consumption as a lens into poverty 
and welfare. For this, Deaton won the 2015 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. See ROYAL 
SWEDISH ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ANGUS DEATON: CONSUMPTION, POVERTY AND WELFARE
(Oct. 2015), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2015/ advanced
-economicsciences2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2EW-K4UA].
72 For one synopsis, see STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY, supra note 28, at 2 (“By 2007, 
the year before the crisis, the top 0.1[%] of America’s households had an income that was 
220 times larger than the average of the bottom 90[%].”). During the financial crisis and 
afterward, recovery was uneven because the wealthy tended to be invested in the financial 
markets (i.e., to recall Piketty’s work, Capital in the Twenty-First Century) and saw their 
losses rebound quickly, while most Americans had their net worth tied up in housing, where 
pricing rebounded more slowly and unevenly. Id. at 3.
73 Id. at 5.
74 See, e.g., Philippe Aghion et al., Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective 
of the New Growth Theories, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1615, 1615 (1999); Alesina & Rodrik, supra
note 70, at 46; Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Is Inequality Harmful for Growth?, 84 
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headwind to growth that it can arrest the momentum of innovation in jolting the 
economy.75 This is in part because feeding the wealth gap means consigning 
workers to part-time jobs with few benefits and no security.76 Simultaneously, 
top earners become closely intertwined with political leaders, from whom they 
extract rents such as tax cuts.77 Consequently, the wealth gap takes a toll on 
investments in education and health both by the government (whose revenues 
are strapped by tax breaks) and by individuals (whose incomes are suppressed 
by unsteady work), which in turn inhibits long-term productivity.78
Sure fixes to inequality include progressive taxation and expansive social 
security,79 but the outsized political influence exerted by the wealthy constrains 
taxes and shreds the social safety net.80 Instead, government leaders frequently 
opt for the politically expedient alternative of loosening access to credit, so as 
to dull the pain of stagnant wages and shrinking public expenditures.81 This, in 
turn, spurs consumption but creates asset bubbles, which then precipitates other 
financial crises that further widen inequality.82
Inequality and its pernicious effects are not only closely correlated, they are 
mutually reinforcing. Besides democracy and economic growth, the wealth gap 
also corrodes race relations and social stability. The wealth gap confines many 
                                                                                                                     
AM. ECON. REV. 600, 607, 617 (1994). For a summary of the research, see Repetti, supra
note 8, at 832–36.
75 See ROBERT J. GORDON, THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN GROWTH 605–41 (2016). 
Admittedly, some inequality is inevitable and can actually propel growth. For this 
conventional view, see ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF
82–88 (1975).
76 For a heartbreaking anecdote, see BRIAN ALEXANDER, GLASS HOUSE: THE 1%
ECONOMY AND THE SHATTERING OF THE ALL-AMERICAN TOWN (2017) (tracing the effect on 
a town’s working class when its largest employer is bought out by private equity).
77 See COMM. FOR ECON. DEV. OF THE CONFERENCE BD., CRONY CAPITALISM:
UNHEALTHY RELATIONS BETWEEN BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 16 (Oct. 2015) (arguing that 
capital gains taxes are favorable to hedge fund managers); WALTER SCHEIDEL, THE GREAT 
LEVELER 51 (2017) (indicating that the rich owe their success as much to political clout as 
to anything else); Todd Zywicki, Rent-Seeking, Crony Capitalism, and the Crony 
Constitution, 23 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 77, 88–89 (2015) (asserting that arbitrary tax breaks 
are a product of rent-seeking); see also STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY, supra note 28, at 
39–43 (defining and describing rent-seeking).
78 Long-term productivity closely tracks education and health. See PIKETTY, supra note 
28, at 21 (“Knowledge and skill diffusion is the key to overall productivity growth as well 
as the reduction of inequality both within and between countries.”).
79 See ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 179–240 (2015).
80 On the push to exert political influence, see McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 
1436 (2014); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 310 (2010); JANE MAYER, DARK MONEY 
227 (2016). On privatization, see STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY, supra note 28, at 176–78.
81 See RAJAN, supra note 50, at 8–9.
82 Id. at 31–45.
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within the minority community to inconsistent and substandard housing83 and 
also saddles them with disproportionate court costs,84 which inhibits the stability 
necessary to build wealth.85 More than any other factor, equality in wealth has 
the greatest equalizing effect between blacks and whites.86 Nor is inequality 
confined to racial minorities. In 2016, voting blocs comprised of working-class 
majority populations unsettled a political orthodoxy that had embraced free 
trade.87 Rightly or wrongly, this bloc attributed its economic demise to 
globalization; with its support, a populist was elected by plurality to the U.S. 
Presidency, and the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union.88
Unfortunately, however, if comparisons are made to societies that exhibit 
similar levels of inequality, these victorious politicians are likely to disappoint 
voters. By the common measure of inequality known as the Gini coefficient, the 
United States is similar to Russia, Turkey, Morocco, and Nicaragua, while the 
United Kingdom is on par with Bosnia, Cambodia, Laos, Italy, Estonia, and Sri 
Lanka.89 Several of these comparators are countries whose leaders stoke fiery 
nationalism even as the broader society crumbles.90
                                                                                                                     
83 See MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY
(2016).
84 Erik Eckholm, Court Costs Entrap Nonwhite, Poor Juvenile Offenders, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/01/us/court-costs-entrap-nonwhite-
poor-juvenile-offenders.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
85 Even more destructive are overpolicing and mass incarceration in minority 
communities (which fattens the coffers of privatized prisons) and substantive and procedural 
dilution of their voting rights (which consolidates political power in the hands of wealthy 
elites). See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS 99 (2010); ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE MODERN 
STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA 44 (2015).
86 The sociologist Dalton Conley found that blacks and whites diverged in wealth 
holdings even when other factors such as education, age, gender, and previous income were 
controlled for. See DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE, WEALTH,
AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 47–49 (2010). However, when class measures were 
equalized, racial differences vanished. Id.
87 Chris Matthews, Everything You Need To Know About Free Trade This Election 
Cycle, FORTUNE (Sept. 13 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/13/free-trade-election/ 
[https://perma.cc/6762-DVM2].
88 Populism is a claim to speak for “the people” that is antipluralist, critical of elites, 
and rooted in identity politics. JAN-WERNER MÜLLER, WHAT IS POPULISM? (2016) 
(explaining the history and theoretical underpinnings of populism).
89 See Human Development Reports: Income Gini Coefficient, UNITED NATIONS DEV.
PROGRAMME, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/income-gini-coefficient [https://perma.cc/9JND-
ECCS]. For an accurate comparison, search for countries which measure at “40,” which 
corresponds to America’s Gini coefficient, and “36,” which corresponds to the United 
Kingdom’s Gini coefficient.
90 Notably, the United States and the United Kingdom are redeemed by their high 
human development indicators; hence, they are clustered around countries rated at “[v]ery 
high human development.” Id. By focusing on inequality to the exclusion of all other factors, 
the Gini coefficient only presents one dimension of society.
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Inequality begets inequality. It spills over “horizontally,” exerting a 
corrosive influence on democracy, education, public health, race relations, and 
social stability. It is also flows “vertically,” passed down from generation to 
generation. A child born into a wealthy family will have a leg up in virtually 
every respect, from nutrition to education to future prospects for employment, 
health, and longevity.91 Inequality’s pervasive and pernicious effects are 
therefore a feedback loop reinforcing the concentration of economic and 
political power in the hands of the very few at the expense of the great many.
3. Central Questions
This Part merely presents a snapshot of inequality’s consequences. There 
are a number of other dimensions that cannot be fully explored here.92 To 
maintain focus, this Article distills the problem of inequality to a few key 
questions for trusts and estates law scholars. 
First, what is the role of trusts and estates law in sustaining inequality? The 
common thread among the multitude of explanations is that laws governing the 
transmission of wealth are weak (e.g., the estate tax) and lax (the use of trusts 
to build dynasties).93
Second, who benefits from this legal landscape? The list is small—the rich, 
of course, and their coterie of lawyers and financial institutions—when 
compared against the magnitude of those on the losing end—government, 
creditors, society.
A third question flows from the above two: What can trusts and estates law 
do about inequality? It turns out that the most effective ways to level out 
economic disparity are war, revolution, state collapse, and plague.94 Short of 
those cataclysms, governments can pursue progressive taxation, pay parity, 
social security, and other policies.95 Yet these measures are insufficient and 
likely to be eroded over the long term. Legal rules governing the transmission 
                                                                                                                     
91 See, e.g., Kirsten Weir, The Health-Wealth Gap: Inequality in the United States Is 
Undermining Americans’ Health and Longevity, Say Experts, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL., Oct.
2013, at 36, 38–39; Annie Lowrey, Income Gap, Meet the Longevity Gap, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 
15, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/business/income-gap-meet-the-longevity-
gap.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
92 For instance, inequality has a geographic dimension. When we speak of inequality, 
we might mean inequality within a country, or among countries, or among the worldwide 
population. See MILANOVIC, supra note 66, at 7–11. Inequality also has a temporal 
dimension. To properly contextualize today’s levels of inequality, we should step back 
further to observe the sweep of inequality throughout history. See PIKETTY, supra note 28; 
SCHEIDEL, supra note 77, at 25–61.
93 See, e.g., Hofri-Winogradow, supra note 38, at 537–51.
94 See SCHEIDEL, supra note 77, at 114–342.
95 ATKINSON, supra note 79, at 237–39; STIGLITZ, PRICE OF INEQUALITY, supra note 28, 
at 265–90.
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of wealth comprise a promising second-best solution,96 especially since these 
rules have not yet been explored for their redistributive propensity the same way 
that business law has. 
However, we must be careful not to overstate their redistributive propensity. 
As the prior Subpart demonstrates, inequality is an affliction whose magnitude 
can hardly be exaggerated, but as the remainder of this Article shows, the rules 
of trusts and estates vary in their redistributive efficiency. Nonetheless, 
recounting inequality’s woes helps to counter the moral force of testamentary 
freedom as an organizing principle for trusts and estates and also to reorient the 
field around an equally pressing imperative: redistribution.
III. REDISTRIBUTION BY RULES IN TRUSTS AND ESTATES
Inequality’s effects are pervasive and pernicious. Yet the legal system 
governing wealth does not adequately prevent inequality at the wealth-
generation end (business law) or the wealth-transmission end (wealth transfer 
taxes). Therefore, we must supplement by turning to the legal rules within trusts 
and estates. This Part organizes the possibilities for doing so. First, it considers 
a hybrid system that blends elements of private law with the tax system—
specifically, the rule against perpetuities, which interfaces with estate taxes. 
Next, this Part examines three groups of rules that can transfer wealth between 
private parties, without the regulatory arm of the State. Broadly construed, these 
rules affect wealth distribution between trusts and creditors (e.g., spendthrift and 
asset protection trusts), between beneficiaries and trustees (e.g., fiduciary 
duties), and among beneficiaries (e.g., abatement, ademption, cy pres, and 
execution formalities).
Before we proceed, however, a few caveats must be laid bare. First, this 
Article takes a welfare economics approach that analyzes the effect of rules on 
the well-being of individuals, with priority given to wealth equality.97 Under 
                                                                                                                     
96 On the origins of the theory of second best, see R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The 
General Theory of Second Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 11 (1956). Application of this 
theory to welfare economics posits that if the Pareto-optimum (i.e., first best) solution is 
unattainable because its conditions do not hold, the remaining conditions to Pareto optimality 
need not be pursued. Id. This theory has become popular in the debate over double distortion, 
as a justification for departing from other Pareto efficiency conditions (i.e., legal rules 
staying out of redistribution) because of inefficiencies in the tax system. See, e.g., Matthew 
Dimick, Should the Law Do Anything About Economic Inequality?, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 1, 60–63 (2016); Sanchirico, supra note 15, at 1017–18.
97 For the pillars of welfare economics, see, for example, KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL 
CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 22–33 (1951); AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED 
5–7 (1992) [hereinafter SEN, INEQUALITY REEXAMINED]; AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC 
INEQUALITY 1–3 (1973). Some scholars have argued that in gauging well-being, subjective 
notions of happiness and justice should not matter at all. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN,
SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 16–19 (2000); KAPLOW &
SHAVELL, supra note 18, at 15–38; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60–65 (1971); SEN,
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this view, redistribution is accomplished by transferring wealth from the rich to 
the poor.98 This is because the marginal utility of increased wealth is greater for 
the poor than the rich; put differently, the poor (who begin with little wealth) 
value slight increases in wealth more than the wealthy (who begin with vast 
wealth).99 Wealth transfers from rich to poor raise overall social welfare, though 
not necessarily overall wealth.
Second, welfare economics governs this Article’s conception of efficiency.
Faced with a choice between two regimes for redistribution, we settle on that 
which distributes wealth most efficiently. “Efficiency” typically refers to either 
Pareto efficiency, where no one is made worse off if someone is made better 
off, or Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, where those made better off can compensate 
those made worse off.100 Pareto efficiency is rare in the real world, so most 
economists and legal scholars settle for Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.101 But as 
between two legal regimes, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency can be indeterminate—that 
is, the Kaldor-Hicks test could justify going from regime A to regime B as much 
as going from regime B to regime A.102 Yet if wealth distribution is factored in, 
the regime that distributes wealth more evenly will prevail.103 Such a result 
satisfies distributive efficiency, rather than Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.
Finally, this Part aims to reconceptualize trusts and estates’ legal rules as 
tools for redistribution. These rules inevitably pit some groups against others 
(e.g., trusts versus creditors, beneficiaries versus trustees); yet the redistributive 
approach does not mean that certain groups will always win. Empirical 
questions regarding relative wealth can help to sort through the rules. More 
fundamentally, this Article adopts approaches from law and economics, which 
has vigorously debated the redistributive potential of legal rules in general.104
By doing so, this Article attempts to breathe new life into old debates within 
                                                                                                                     
INEQUALITY REEXAMINED, supra, at 6, 56–72; John Rawls, Social Unity and Primary Goods,
in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 159, 162–63 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 
1982).
98 ARROW, supra note 97, at 22–25.
99 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV.
961, 990–92 (2001).
100 Jules L. Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare, 112 YALE L.J. 1511, 1516–17 (2003) 
(book review).
101 Id. at 1517–19.
102 This is because the winners in the change of A to B could compensate the losers, but 
if the situation were reversed, the winners in the change of B to A could just as easily
compensate the losers. See id. at 1517.
103 See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 18, at 459 n.139 (“[I]t may be indeterminate 
whether regime A, in which Jack gets $100 and Jill gets $50, or regime B, in which each gets 
$75, is more efficient, but a social welfare function . . . would produce a clear choice. In this 
example, plausible social welfare functions would ordinarily favor the more equal 
distribution . . . .”).
104 See, e.g., supra note 17.
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trusts and estates. The examples in the following Subparts are starting points for 
what will hopefully become a broader effort to reimagine the field.
A. Private-Rule/Tax-and-Transfer Hybrid: The Rule Against 
Perpetuities
1. Background
Redistribution can occur either by the public tax-and-transfer system (i.e., 
taxes) or by private law (i.e., legal rules).105 Yet an intermediate scheme exists 
within the dichotomy: a hybrid that has elements of both private law and the 
tax-and-transfer system. For instance, one side of the redistribution scheme (the 
taking or the giving) might be accomplished through legal rules, while the other 
might be achieved through taxes or other state action.106 Examples include 
eminent domain, where local government takes property from landowners, and 
voucher systems, where federal or state governments convey in-kind benefits to 
recipients.107
In trusts and estates, the rule against perpetuities (RAP) fits within this 
hybrid model. The RAP is a vestige of common law that affects transactions 
between private parties. The rule states that “a contingent future interest must 
vest, if at all, within twenty-one years after the expiration of some life in being 
when the interest was created.”108 In the trusts context, the RAP limits the 
vesting of assets in remote contingent beneficiaries.109 A paradigmatic example 
is a trust that devises property to a succession of life estate holders—for 
example, the settlor’s child for life, then the child’s children for their lives—and 
then the principal to contingent remaindermen—for example, the settlor’s
grandchildren.110 If the contingent remaindermen are too remote, the trust 
effectively terminates at the expiration of the last life estate.111
Such a trust interfaces with the tax-and-transfer system through the estate
tax and generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax, which taxes transfers to a 
settlor’s grandchildren. However, the law also includes an exclusion amount 
that has swelled in recent years by virtue of tax reform and indexing for 
                                                                                                                     
105 See Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 15.
106 Daphna Lewinsohn-Zamir, In Defense of Redistribution Through Private Law, 91 
MINN. L. REV. 326, 333–34 (2006).
107 Id. at 380, 390–96.
108 Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 UCLA L. 
REV. 1303, 1304 (2003).
109 At its heart, the RAP balances the freedom of the current generation against the 
freedom of future generations to control property. T.P. Gallanis, The Rule Against 
Perpetuities and the Law Commission’s Flawed Philosophy, 59 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 284, 284 
(2000).
110 Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 108, at 1312.
111 Id. at 1313 n.36.
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inflation.112 The exclusion amount for all gift, estate, and GST taxes was $1 
million in 2010, $5 million in 2011, and $5.45 million in 2016; for 2017, it was
$5.49 million.113 Thus, a settlor could evade taxes by creating a trust that would 
last as long as possible, devising $5.49 million (or its inflation-adjusted 
equivalent) to a succession of life estates and then a set of contingent 
remainders. Such a trust would be taxed only when it terminated, and 
termination is governed by the perpetuities period under state law.
In recent decades, states have altered or outright repealed the RAP. Some 
jurisdictions have adopted a wait-and-see approach that permits waiting for 
some period to determine whether contingent remainders might vest, effectively 
extending a trust for at least that long.114 Other states have adopted the more 
explicit Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities, which sets a fixed 
perpetuities period ranging from 90 to 1,000 years after creation.115 Most 
recently, some states have abolished the RAP outright.116 The ensuing trusts 
created under such regimes can last in perpetuity, while also avoiding estate and 
GST taxes.117 Such trusts are called “perpetual trusts” or “dynasty trusts.”
2. Redistributive Reforms
Defending the RAP from the current onslaught is a natural—and efficient—
starting point for redressing wealth inequality within trusts and estates. There 
are a number of ways to bolster the RAP, ranging from cautious to sweeping. 
Straightforward solutions include taxing dynasty trusts,118 legislating dynasty 
                                                                                                                     
112 See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, §§ 302–304, 124 Stat. 3296, 3301–04 (2010).
113 What’s New - Estate and Gift Tax, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/
businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/whats-new-estate-and-gift-tax [https://perma.cc/H7JD-
JTAW].
114 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2131.08 (LexisNexis 2016); 20 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6104 (West Supp. 2017); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 501 (LexisNexis 
2012); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.3 (AM. LAW. INST.
1981).
115 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2901 (2012); CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 21200–
21202 (West Supp. 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-11-1101 to -1107 (West Supp. 2016); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 45a-490 to -496 (West Supp. 2017); see also Jesse Dukeminier, 
The Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities: Ninety Years in Limbo, 34 UCLA L. REV.
1023, 1023 (1987); Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Uniform Statutory Rule Against 
Perpetuities: The Rationale of the 90-Year Waiting Period, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 157–
59 (1988).
116 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 55-111 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-5-8 (2004).
117 In fact, empirical evidence suggests that perpetual trusts—and abolition of the 
RAP—arose in response to the GST tax. See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 68, at 373–
74.
118 Joel C. Dobris, Undoing Repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities: Federal and State
Tools for Breaking Dynasty Trusts, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2537, 2541–42 (2006).
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trusts out of existence,119 and reinstating the RAP so as to abolish the interstate 
race to the bottom.120 Admittedly, these may be politically infeasible because 
they require drastic legislative action. A more moderate change is to give courts 
the ability to tinker with dynasty trusts, such as a cy pres power to modify or 
terminate trusts that do not increase net social welfare.121 More cautious still, 
reforms can target the measuring lives of the RAP—for instance, limiting 
beneficiaries to no more than two generations beyond the grantor,122 rather than 
resorting to the arcane malpractice trap of “lives in being.”123 Of course, 
additional empirical and technical analysis must be conducted to settle on the 
best approach.
Overall, the RAP should occupy a central role in our redistribution project. 
A quick glimpse of the opposing sides of perpetuities reform reveals why.
Dynasty trusts are roundly condemned by most commentators.124 Advocates of 
the rule’s repeal tend to be a much smaller group of financial institutions and 
estate planning attorneys.125 Substantively, however, there is in the RAP a 
confluence of factors not found elsewhere in the field.
First, as a mode of redistribution, the RAP is particularly efficient. The RAP 
affects the wealthy—those settlors who can create a dynasty trust with the 
requisite corpus of $5.49 million. Further, the RAP singles out settlors with 
                                                                                                                     
119 Id. at 2542.
120 Id. at 2545–46. On the jurisdictional competition to eliminate the RAP, see Sterk, 
supra note 68, at 2105, and Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 68, at 373–78.
121 See Ronald Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in the 21st Century: The 
Uniform Trust Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 697, 724–26
(2001); Dobris, supra note 118, at 2546 n.42.
122 This approach to revitalize the RAP is reflected in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 27.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2011), which adopts 
the recommendations in Daniel M. Schuyler, Should the Rule Against Perpetuities Discard 
Its Vest?, 56 MICH. L. REV. 683, 683, 709 (1958), and T.P. Gallanis, The Future of Future 
Interests, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 513, 549, 559–60 (2003).
123 On the rule’s technical difficulties, see, for example, G. Graham Waite, Let’s Abolish 
the Rule Against Perpetuities, 21 REAL EST. L.J. 93, 97 (1992); Keith L. Butler, Note, Long 
Live the Dead Hand: A Case for Repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities in Washington, 75 
WASH. L. REV. 1237, 1238 (2000); see also Paul G. Haskell, A Proposal for a Simple and 
Socially Effective Rule Against Perpetuities, 66 N.C. L. REV. 545, 545 (1988). Of course, if 
perpetuities reform is not animated by the bar’s fear of malpractice (and it is not), then this 
reform will not forestall the RAP’s erosion.
124 See, e.g., Joel C. Dobris, Essay, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the 
RAP Has No Friends, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 601–02 (2000); Dukeminier, supra 
note 115, at 1025; Sterk, supra note 68, at 2097–99.
125 See Grayson M.P. McCouch, Who Killed the Rule Against Perpetuities?, 40 PEPP. L.
REV. 1291, 1292 (2013); Waite, supra note 123, at 99. On the prevalence of dynasty trusts 
among estate planning attorneys, see Adam Hofri-Winogradow, The Demand for Fiduciary 
Services: Evidence from the Market in Private Donative Trusts, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 931
(2017).
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dynastic aspirations.126 The RAP also interacts with wealth transfer taxes. This 
nexus permits the State to be involved; as illustrated above with regulators in 
business law, the State has more information than a court regarding the 
macroeconomic effects of distribution. All in all, the RAP facilitates a transfer 
of wealth from the very rich (when it forces a trust to terminate and be subjected 
to estate and transfer taxes) to the poor (by virtue of distribution in the tax 
system).
Second, because the RAP represents a hybrid model that aligns closely with 
estate and GST taxes, the distortionary effect of the rule on the parties involved 
is not as severe as a rule which operates wholly outside the tax system. The 
“double distortion” argument holds that a rule which redistributes income 
compounds the economic distortions already present in the tax system.127
Therefore, legal rules should aim for efficiency, leaving redistribution to the tax 
system.128 The counterarguments challenge double distortion’s premises and 
posit that deficient tax systems must be supplemented with redistributive legal 
rules.129 For our current purposes, we can reduce double distortion to its 
essential argument: the tax system is the most efficient way to address 
inequality, and legal rules are inefficient when they attempt to do the same.130
Yet when the tax system departs from optimal efficiency, the ancillary legal 
                                                                                                                     
126 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS 14 (2009) (“[S]ome of the most arcane and 
mysterious rules find their explanation, ultimately, in their impact on dynastic wealth.”); 
Hirsch & Wang, supra note 6, at 33 (“[M]ore extensive powers of serial 
distribution . . . create an opportunity for the testator to satisfy her dynastic ambitions.”); 
McCouch, supra note 125, at 1300 (“[P]romotional literature [for perpetual trusts] is replete 
with thinly veiled appeals to settlors’ vanity and dynastic aspirations.”).
127 This argument is most closely associated with Professors Louis Kaplow and Steven 
Shavell. See Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 15, at 667–68. However, it 
descends from a line of political philosophy traceable to John Rawls. See RAWLS, supra note 
97, at 278 (“[I]nheritance is permissible provided that the resulting inequalities are to the 
advantage of the least fortunate and compatible with liberty and fair equality of 
opportunity . . . . [F]air equality of opportunity means a certain set of institutions that assures 
similar chances of education and culture for persons similarly motivated . . . .”).
128 Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 15, at 667–68. More specific to our 
discussion, Professor Kaplow has also explored the interaction of income taxes and estate 
and gift taxes. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Tax Policy and Gifts, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 283, 288 
(1998); Kaplow, supra note 47, 204. Kaplow cautions that taxes on wealth transfers may 
create their own distortion, apart from the labor distortions of the income tax, though the 
precise interaction between the two tax regimes depends on a wide range of assumptions.
129 See, e.g., Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note 15, at 6; Dimick, supra note 96, at 4; 
David Gamage, The Case for Taxing (All of) Labor Income, Consumption, Capital Income, 
and Wealth, 68 TAX L. REV. 355, 422–29 (2015); Sanchirico, supra note 15, at 1084.
130 This is more systematically explored by Kaplow and Shavell in a series of works that 
frames fairness and welfare as mutually exclusive. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 18; 
Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 99, at 966, 990–93.
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rules no longer produce efficient results if they remain in their optimal states.131
By extension, legal rules must assume the distributive mantle (and therefore 
depart from the efficient state of eschewing distribution) to correct for flaws in 
the tax system. To give a concrete example, we might say that redistribution in 
trusts and estates is best accomplished by a combination of estate, gift, and GST 
taxes. We might also say that the balances struck by the RAP should not 
contemplate distributive ends whatsoever.132 Yet when the tax system fails to 
transfer wealth from the rich to the poor,133 the legal rule has to step in to offset 
that inefficiency in the tax system.134 Hence, the RAP must stand as a bulwark 
against dynasty trusts, to compel their termination and taxation at some point.135
Third, much of the wealth held in trusts is capital—financial instruments, 
equity in enterprises, and real estate.136 To the extent that a differential in capital 
and income drives inequality,137 unlocking assets sequestered in trust for 
taxation or productive use can at least allow some of the assets to be 
redistributed.138
                                                                                                                     
131 In other words, the optimal efficiency of rules depends on the optimal efficiency of 
taxes; when taxes depart from optimal efficiency, the rules need not—in fact, should not—
hold fast to the same positions. See Dimick, supra note 96, at 63–64.
132 Instead, it should focus on balancing the interests of current and future beneficiaries. 
But even this is far from clear. See Gallanis, supra note 109, at 292 (arguing that economic, 
rather than normative arguments, best support the RAP).
133 For example, because legislative capture allows tax exclusions to be raised and rates 
to be reduced year after year.
134 In other words, inefficient from a welfare economics perspective because the system 
raises overall inequality. Distributive efficiency is distinguishable from efficiency in general, 
which “denote[s] that allocation of resources in which value is maximized.” RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (7th ed. 2007).
135 This complementary relationship between the RAP and taxes is similar to that 
between income and consumption taxes, which has animated much of the double distortion 
debate. See Gamage, supra note 129, at 359. Beyond the initial exploration of this Article, a 
great deal more work can be done on the efficiencies of tinkering with the RAP, including 
the distortions on consumption and labor, the external effects on trust beneficiaries and 
society, and, more fundamentally, whether a strong RAP is an efficient and redistributive 
legal rule or an inefficient but redistributive legal rule.
136 See John H. Langbein, Lecture, Why Did Trust Law Become Statute Law in the 
United States?, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1069, 1072 (2007) (“[T]he characteristic trust asset has 
ceased to be ancestral land and has become instead a portfolio of marketable securities.”).
137 PIKETTY, supra note 28, at 444. Piketty’s findings have been criticized for not 
sufficiently distinguishing between capital and land. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, New Theoretical 
Perspectives on the Distribution of Income and Wealth Among Individuals, in 1 INEQUALITY 
AND GROWTH 1, 2–3 (Kaushik Basu & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2016).
138 In some sense, this is a variation of the old justification for the RAP: that it keeps 
trust property in the stream of commerce, to be put to productive use rather than to fester. 
See Waite, supra note 123, at 96; Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities,
116 HARV. L. REV. 2588, 2597 (2003). This argument assumes that “unlocked” assets will 
be put to productive use rather than deposited in trust and, furthermore, that productive use
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There are, however, potential criticisms of the RAP as a redistribution 
mechanism. One line of criticism is inherent to hybrid schemes generally—the 
two sides of the scheme, the “rich” and the “needy,” never directly interact but 
only deal with the State.139 There is no fostering of relationships, as there is in 
a legal rule that affects two private parties.140 Further, the efficacy of the scheme 
depends as much on the robustness of estate taxes as on the perpetuities period; 
where tax exemptions are large and tax rates slim, the redistributive effects of 
the RAP will be hampered. Finally, from a practical perspective, upon the 
termination of a dynasty trust, beneficiaries may simply redeposit the assets into 
other trusts.141 Nonetheless, even if all of these criticisms ring true, limiting the 
duration of dynasty trusts will enable the generation of some tax revenue, which 
can then be redistributed. Additionally, the RAP must not be analyzed in 
isolation; it is the RAP in conjunction with asset protection trusts that wreaks 
the most havoc upon wealth equality.142
B. Purely Private Legal Rules
Purely private legal rules constitute another mode for redistribution. For 
this, trusts and estates law is a particularly fertile realm—here the law is 
comprised of a myriad of rules. This Subpart focuses on three groups of rules: 
redistribution from settlors and beneficiaries to creditors; redistribution from 
trustees to beneficiaries; and redistribution among beneficiaries.143
                                                                                                                     
directly benefits the poor rather than, say, the assets being pledged as collateral for loans to 
develop land, which then widens inequality.
139 Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 106, at 390–92.
140 See id. at 392. 
141 Scott Andrew Shepard, A Uniform Perpetuities Reform Act, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 89, 103–04 (2013) (“If we assume minimal competence on the part of the 
beneficiaries (or their attorneys and financial advisors), then we can expect them simply to 
redeposit that res in trusts indistinguishable from the trust just concluded—in no way 
diminishing the dynasty family’s aggregate wealth.”).
142 Dobris, supra note 118, at 2539 (“[T]he toxic combo is perpetual trusts and asset 
protection trusts.” (footnote omitted)).
143 Some of these legal rules also intersect with the tax system. For instance, transfers to 
APTs might trigger tax implications. See Karen E. Boxx, Gray’s Ghost—A Conversation 
About the Onshore Trust, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1195, 1241–51 (2000); Randall J. Gingiss, 
Putting a Stop to “Asset Protection” Trusts, 51 BAYLOR L. REV. 987, 1005–08 (1999). In 
this sense, these rules are hybrid modes of redistribution, and the same considerations 
explored above will apply. However, the remainder of this Subpart explores the private 
dimensions of these rules—that is, only redistribution among the parties affected by the rules. 
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1. Beneficiaries/Settlors Versus Creditors: Spendthrift and
Asset Protection Trusts
a. Background
Spendthrift and asset protection trusts apportion wealth between settlors and 
beneficiaries on one hand and creditors on the other. A spendthrift trust—or, 
more precisely, a trust with the “disabling restraint” of a spendthrift 
provision144—prevents the sale, assignment, and alienation of a beneficiary’s
interest in a trust.145 The restraint bars immediate consumption of the interest 
either by the beneficiary selling the interest for a lump sum or by a creditor 
levying execution against the interest.146 Thus, if a plaintiff has successfully 
sued a trust beneficiary for sexually assaulting her child and broadcasting the 
assault over the Internet, the plaintiff cannot reach the trust assets to satisfy the 
judgment if the trust contains a spendthrift provision.147 Ostensibly, the settlor 
of the trust inserted spendthrift language to insulate the assets, perhaps because 
the settlor did not trust the beneficiary with unfettered access.
If, however, the trust were self settled—created by a settlor to shield assets 
from his own creditors—then the settlor and the beneficiary are one and the 
same.148 Now the creditor is a creditor to the settlor. A self-settled spendthrift 
trust is more commonly known as an asset protection trust (APT). American 
laws were initially reluctant to recognize APTs since the notion of a debtor 
creating a vehicle to protect assets from his creditors smacks of fraudulent 
conveyance.149 Yet as offshore jurisdictions validated APTs and assets started 
flowing abroad, American states began to follow suit.150 This precipitated a 
“race to the bottom” for trust assets and trust administration similar to the 
competition for corporate charters in state corporate law.151
A statute that recognizes APTs can thwart creditor recovery by narrowing 
the fraudulent transfer exception,152 shortening the statute of limitations on 
                                                                                                                     
144 Adam J. Hirsch, Spendthrift Trusts and Public Policy: Economic and Cognitive 
Perspectives, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 2 (1995).
145 See UNIF. TR. CODE § 502(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN 
ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 417–20 (4th ed. 2010).
146 UNIF. TR. CODE § 502(c).
147 Scheffel v. Krueger, 782 A.2d 410, 411–12 (N.H. 2001).
148 See Boxx, supra note 143, at 1198.
149 UNIF. TR. CODE § 505 cmt. See generally 2A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM 
FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 156, at 164–86 (4th ed. 1987). This view is still 
reflected in the Restatement and the Uniform Trust Code. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS § 58(2) & cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2003); UNIF. TR. CODE § 505(a)(2).
150 See Sterk, supra note 19, at 1047–55.
151 Id.
152 For example, by requiring that the settlor was insolvent when the creditor claim arose. 
See International Trusts Act 1984, § 13B (Cook Islands).
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claims,153 and barring enforcement of foreign judgments.154 Thus, if promoters 
of a telemarketing Ponzi scheme were sued by the Federal Trade Commission, 
the promoters could transfer their assets to an offshore APT organized under the 
permissive laws of the Cook Islands, and the Commission would have limited 
recourse (i.e., contempt sanctions).155 The promoters’ assets would lie beyond 
the reach of a U.S. court because they rest in a jurisdiction unwilling to tap trust 
assets to satisfy foreign judgments.156
Notably, spendthrift provisions and APTs are subject to conditions. Both 
sets of legal rules feature exceptions protecting the claims of certain creditors—
typically, spouses seeking alimony and children seeking support.157 In some 
states, the exceptions for spendthrift trusts are expanded to claims by providers 
of necessities and also of services to protect trust beneficiaries’ interests.158
APTs, because they are inherently more reprehensible, permit additional 
carve-outs. These include prohibitions against fraudulent transfers and 
requirements of irrevocability.159
b. Redistributive Reforms
For spendthrift provisions and APTs, the key to redistribution lies in their 
exceptions and conditions—which, if rigorous, prevent settlors from fully 
shielding their assets. Enabling recovery by certain creditors such as spouses 
and children operates to shift wealth from beneficiaries and settlors to these 
creditors. So, too, does a hard and fast requirement that spendthrift trusts be 
irrevocable. The most embattled exception, though, is fraudulent transfer: under 
fraudulent conveyance law, transfers made to hinder creditor claims can be set 
aside.160 While this law has traditionally covered both actual and constructive 
fraud by debtors,161 at least one state now requires creditors to prove actual 
fraud.162 Shoring up the fraudulent transfer exception to encompass constructive 
(rather than actual) fraud by grantors helps to shift wealth to creditors. The 
                                                                                                                     
153 Id. at § 13B(3)(b).
154 Id. at § 13D.
155 See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 
1999); Sterk, supra note 19, at 1102–03.
156 See Affordable Media, 179 F.3d at 1240.
157 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59(a) (AM. LAW INST. 2001); UNIF. TR.
CODE § 503(b)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). These limitations are common to the general 
scheme of trusts and estates. 
158 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 59(b); UNIF. TR. CODE § 503(b)(2).
159 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570(11)(b), 3572(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2016). 
160 UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT §§ 4, 6–7 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1918); UNIF.
FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT §§ 4–5 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1984). This is espoused in the 
Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act of 1918 (UFCA) and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act of 1984 (UFTA), which has supplanted the UFCA in many states.
161 See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a)(1)–(2).
162 See ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.010 (2016).
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exception can also be fortified by recognizing the claims of both current and 
future creditors.163
Either way, fraud is still difficult to prove, as most corporate practitioners 
can attest.164 This shortcoming extends to trusts and estates as well.165
Moreover, fraudulent conveyance had stood for centuries as the doctrinal 
justification for barring self-settled spendthrift trusts,166 the view being that it 
was beyond the pale for a debtor to thwart creditors by creating a trust for his 
benefit.167 The advent of foreign, and then domestic, APTs chipped away at that 
modicum of propriety as states adopted a series of mechanisms curtailing the 
ability of creditors to recover.168
This should not imply that pro-creditor reforms are out of reach. Because 
APTs provoke uncommonly sharp ire, proposals to rein them in do not suffer 
from lack of imagination. Those proposals include constitutional challenges to 
APTs,169 as well as federal reforms to bankruptcy170 and Medicaid,171 which 
would pre-empt state APT law. More fanciful still are calls to criminalize 
transfers to offshore APTs and to limit these trusts to jurisdictions bound by 
treaty to cooperate with the United States.172 These proposals are unlikely to 
transpire since they require tremendous political will on the part of federal and 
                                                                                                                     
163 The UFTA already does this. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4(a); Sterk, 
supra note 19, at 1045. However, some states limit the exception’s efficacy by undercutting 
the statute of limitations for claims against trusts. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.40.110(d)(2); 
see also Boxx, supra note 143, at 1223–24.
164 Sterk, supra note 19, at 1046–47. But see Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, In Search of a 
Unifying Principle for Article V of the Uniform Trust Code: A Response to Professor 
Danforth, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2609, 2611 (2006) (“As long as fraudulent conveyance laws 
are enforced and not easily evaded, the settlor will not be able to impair creditors’ access to 
the trust assets.” (footnote omitted)).
165 See Boxx, supra note 143, at 1240 (“[A] fraudulent conveyance claim is difficult for 
a plaintiff to establish, and, if the transfer falls short of the definition of fraudulent 
conveyance, the legislation has harmed the creditor by giving the debtor a relatively painless 
way to put assets beyond the reach of the creditor.”).
166 That is, if we trace the roots of fraudulent conveyance (as many commentators do) 
to the English Statute of Elizabeth, enacted in 1570. See 5 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW § 42.03 
(Theodore Eisenberg ed., 2008).
167 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
168 See supra notes 149–51, 162 and accompanying text; see also John K. Eason, Policy, 
Logic, and Persuasion in the Evolving Realm of Trust Asset Protection, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
2621, 2655–61 (2006); Gingiss, supra note 143, at 1008–12.
169 See Boxx, supra note 143, at 1230–31 (Contract Clause); id. at 1208–10 (Full Faith 
and Credit Clause, for recognition of out-of-state judgments); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 10, cl. 1.
170 See Eason, supra note 168, at 2667–70 (exploring the eventually unsuccessful 
proposal, as part of the debate surrounding the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005, to cap APTs at $125,000).
171 Id. at 2678–82 (speculating on whether the Medicaid program will eventually limit 
the ability of applicants to utilize APTs in the qualification process).
172 See Gingiss, supra note 143, at 1008.
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state legislators, who are already prone to capture. More realistic are acts of 
judicial resistance within the bounds of existing law.173 In this regard, one viable 
alternative is for judges to liberally utilize contempt sanctions for settlors who 
refuse to turn over assets sequestered in APTs to satisfy judgment.174
Rather than put up procedural barriers to spendthrift trusts, another way 
forward is to expand recovery for additional subsets of creditors. Indeed, this 
may be an important first step in the exploration of the distributive efficiency of 
spendthrift trust exceptions, because it forces us to consider the relative wealth 
of the parties involved. 
As in business law, trusts encounter two types of creditors: contract 
creditors and tort creditors. The treatment of these two groups is not parallel. In 
corporate law, a creditor who has secured judgment against an undercapitalized 
enterprise can “pierce the corporate veil” by going directly to the equity holder 
to satisfy judgment. The creditor might be seeking recovery for an unpaid bill175
or a tort injury.176 A successful case can strip the limited liability protection for 
enterprise equity holders.
Empirical studies show that veil piercing cases are more successful if 
brought by contract creditors than tort creditors.177 This may be for practical 
reasons. Courts tend to permit veil piercing when the facts indicate 
misrepresentation, and misrepresentation is easier to substantiate with a prior
course of dealing that leaves a document trail.178 By contrast, the tort setting 
does not implicate misrepresentation. This empirical finding belies strong 
normative and theoretical arguments to the contrary. Tort creditors should be 
more successful precisely because there is no course of dealing through which 
they can extract safeguards.179 Instead, the interaction is typically unexpected 
and wholly involuntary, so there is no chance to demand a premium from a 
tortfeasor-beneficiary in exchange for limitations on recovery.180
                                                                                                                     
173 See Daniel A. Farber, What (If Anything) Can Economics Say About Equity?, 101 
MICH. L. REV. 1791, 1816 n.45 (2003) (book review) (“[P]ublic choice problems might make 
it easier to use the courts than the legislature for redistribution. Certainly, recent rounds of 
tax legislation have not been an edifying spectacle.”).
174 But see Sterk, supra note 19, at 1102–03 (noting contempt sanctions have limited 
long-term effect).
175 See, e.g., Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Pepper Source, 941 F.2d 519, 519–20 (7th Cir. 
1991). 
176 See, e.g., Walkovszky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 7 (N.Y. 1966).
177 See Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An Empirical Study, 76 
CORNELL L. REV. 1036, 1058 (1991).
178 See id. at 1064–65, 1068–70.
179 See Adam J. Hirsch, Fear Not the Asset Protection Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 
2692–94 (2006) [hereinafter Hirsch, Fear Not the APT]; Hirsch, supra note 144, at 77–79.
180 Thus, in the corporate setting, scholars have argued for unlimited shareholder liability 
for tort claims, but so far, lawmakers have not been persuaded. See Henry Hansmann & 
Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts, 100 YALE
L.J. 1879, 1916–23 (1991).
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The absence of recourse for involuntary creditors is decried by detractors 
and supporters of spendthrift trusts alike.181 Bankruptcy, corporate, and tort law 
reflect similar criticisms.182 Nevertheless, legislatures are inconsistent when 
they enact spendthrift trusts; some jurisdictions protect involuntary creditors, 
while others do not.183 An unequivocal exception would serve as a mode of 
redistribution.
The distributive efficiency of a tort creditor exception depends on the 
relative wealth of tortfeasor-beneficiaries and tort victim-creditors. Decades 
ago, it was charged that spendthrift trusts “permit children of rich men to live in 
debt and luxury.”184 While the dollar amounts protected by spendthrift trusts are 
hard to pin down, it is estimated that spendthrift trusts, APTs, and trusts in 
general hold astronomical wealth for their beneficiaries.185 On the other hand, 
victims of environmental torts—and perhaps even intentional and negligence 
torts—tend to be drawn from poor (and minority) communities.186 On average, 
then, settlors and beneficiaries of these trusts may well be wealthier than tort 
creditors.
These empirical questions must be answered with precision for the tort-
creditor exception to work. In fact, empirical “indeterminacy” is a major 
obstacle to the enhancement of social welfare by way of legal rules.187 However, 
once these questions are answered, the exception may be refined. For instance, 
if victims of environmental or strict liability torts tend to be uniformly poor, 
then perhaps the exception to spendthrift and asset protection trusts should 
extend only to creditors pursuing satisfaction of judgment for those torts.188 In 
any event, a tort creditor exception is a good place to start. As scholarship 
                                                                                                                     
181 See, e.g., Boxx, supra note 143, at 1257–59; Hirsch, Fear Not the APT, supra note 
179, at 2692–94; Hirsch, supra note 144, at 77–79; Sterk, supra note 19, at 1073.
182 E.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the 
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 91 (1985); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 180, at 
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183 See Eason, supra note 168, at 2661–62.
184 Willard M. Bushman, The (In)Validity of Spendthrift Trusts, 47 OR. L. REV. 304, 312 
(1968).
185 See Anne S. Emanuel, Spendthrift Trusts: It’s Time To Codify the Compromise, 72 
NEB. L. REV. 179, 182 n.16 (1993); Sterk, supra note 19, at 1036.
186 See Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 799–800 (1990); 
Robert D. Bullard, Essay, Environmental Racism and ‘Invisible’ Communities, 96 W. VA.
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95 (2003).
187 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 99, at 1374–76.
188 Similarly, in a comparative negligence regime, where defendants lose if they are 
careless, it might be hypothesized that tortfeasors are comparatively better off than tort 
victims. After all, tortfeasors lose if they are careless, and those with a lower marginal utility 
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for damages (the poor).
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develops on redistributive potential of piercing the spendthrift trust, analysis can 
widen to exceptions for contract creditors. However, empirical and theoretical 
inquiries will be more complicated because, among other things, contract 
creditors might be more economically diverse.
2. Beneficiaries Versus Trustees: Fiduciary Duties
So far, this Part has contemplated legal rules primarily through the lens of 
distributive efficiency. Yet there are many rules in trusts and estates where the 
analysis is fraught with other concerns that muddle the redistributive 
calculation. One such concern is fairness, which includes notions of justice, 
equity, rights, and related concepts but not social welfare.189 To explore the 
intersections and divergences of fairness and welfare, this Subpart evaluates the 
redistributive propensities (and limitations) of fiduciary duties, which govern 
relations between beneficiaries and trustees.
a. Background
Fiduciary duties determine the legal boundaries of agents’ behavior toward 
their principals. The officer–shareholder relationship in a corporation, for 
example, is an agency relationship where officers are bound by fiduciary 
duties.190 So, too, are the partner–partnership,191 investor–investment 
adviser,192 and executor–estate relationships.193 For trusts in particular, 
fiduciary duties evolved to protect beneficiaries from trustees. As in all agency 
situations, the interests of beneficiaries and trustees can be misaligned. 
Distinctive features about trusts amplify the potential for trustees to behave 
badly: trustees hold legal but not beneficial title in trust property, which may 
lead them to pursue imprudent investment strategies, while beneficiaries often 
lack the capacity or knowledge to be able to monitor trustees.194
Over time, agency law devised a number of duties for agents—specifically, 
the duties of (1) loyalty, (2) care, (3) good faith and fair dealing, (4) disclosure, 
(5) accounting and maintenance of the principal’s funds, (6) good conduct and 
                                                                                                                     
189 See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 18, at 38–45; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 
99, at 999–1005.
190 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30 (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2013); 
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obedience, and (7) indemnification.195 Of these, only loyalty, care, and, 
depending on the jurisdiction, sometimes good faith and disclosure count as 
fiduciary duties,196 obliging the agent “to act primarily for the benefit of” the 
principal.197 Within this subset, the paramount fiduciary duty is loyalty, 
described as “stricter than the morals of the market place,” “the punctilio of an 
honor the most sensitive,” “unbending and inveterate,” and uncompromisingly 
rigid.198
In trusts, elements of the duty of loyalty constitute a “mandatory core” that 
cannot be eviscerated by contract.199 Most prominently, section 1008 of the 
Uniform Trust Code (UTC) bars an exculpation clause that (1) “relieves the 
trustee of liability for breach of trust committed in bad faith or with reckless 
indifference to the purposes of the trust or the interests of the beneficiaries”200
or (2) “was inserted as the result of an abuse by the trustee of a fiduciary or 
confidential relationship to the settlor.”201 The first prohibition, on exculpation 
for bad faith and recklessness, is reflected in corporate law.202 The second 
prohibition essentially requires that exculpations be made in good faith.203
Finally, section 1008 compels exculpations (3) be “fair under the 
circumstances” and “adequately communicated to the settlor.”204 This third
mandate, of fairness and adequate disclosure, also has analogs in business 
law.205 At its core, it embodies our tastes and preferences for fairness in 
                                                                                                                     
195 See J. DENNIS HYNES & MARK J. LOEWENSTEIN, AGENCY, PARTNERSHIP, AND THE 
LLC: THE LAW OF UNINCORPORATED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 45–61 (8th ed. 2011).
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separated out as a standalone duty. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) 
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197 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
198 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928).
199 See UNIF. TR. CODE §§ 105(b)(10), 1008 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); John H. 
Langbein, Essay, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1123 
(2004).
200 UNIF. TR. CODE § 1008(a)(1).
201 Id. § 1008(a)(2).
202 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2006).
203 See Langbein, supra note 199, at 1123.
204 UNIF. TR. CODE § 1008(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
205 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 390 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (requiring 
agent acting on own account still to deal fairly and disclose); REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT
§ 404(d) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1997) (requiring partners to discharge duties consistent with 
good faith and fair dealing); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2006) (requiring 
material facts of a conflicted transaction to be disclosed, and the transaction to be fair).
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fiduciary law.206 After all, it might well be Kaldor-Hicks efficient for a trustee 
to compensate the principal for a waiver by lowering fees or agreeing to take 
stewardship of complex assets. Yet the UTC refuses to reduce exculpations to 
an efficient-transaction analysis. Thus, even though a libertarian revolution has 
swept through business law to render most fiduciary duties waivable,207 in trusts 
the duty of loyalty has never fully succumbed to contractarianism.208 And the 
requirements of good faith, fairness, and disclosure form a buffer against 
contractarian creep.209
We should not lose perspective. Viewed against the grand scheme of trusts 
law, section 1008 is more an anomaly than a buffer. The libertarian revolution 
has permeated trusts almost as thoroughly as it has business law;210 the core 
fiduciary duties of loyalty,211 impartiality,212 and care213 have become mere 
defaults that can be modified by settlors.214 This is not surprising. If loyalty, the 
pinnacle of the fiduciary standard, can be broadly (though not completely) 
waived, then lesser duties can be obliterated.215 In corporate law, for example, 
this means that an agent’s duty of care is not simply the reasonable man standard 
from negligence law; to prevail on breach of care, a plaintiff needs to prove 
                                                                                                                     
206 See generally Ward Farnsworth, The Taste for Fairness, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1992 
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see also T.P. Gallanis, The Trustee’s Duty To Inform, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1595, 1598–99 (2007).
210 See Adam S. Hofri-Winogradow, Essay, Contract, Trust, and Corporation: From 
Contrast to Convergence, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1691, 1705–10 (2017). 
211 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1959); UNIF. TR. CODE
§ 802(a).
212 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 183, 232; UNIF. TR. CODE § 803.
213 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174; UNIF. TR. CODE § 804.
214 Or, more precisely, these duties are not designated as mandatory by the UTC, which 
supports the conclusion that they are waivable. See Langbein, supra note 199, at 1122.
215 We also trust agents to be careful more than we trust them to be loyal. See POSNER,
supra note 134, at 441.
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conduct somewhere in the vicinity of gross negligence216 and also to overcome 
procedural obstacles in the business judgment rule217—assuming that a
corporate charter provision does not insulate agents from breach of care.218
In trusts, the duty of care takes a slightly different turn. A trustee must still 
administer the trust “as a prudent person would,” exercising “reasonable care, 
skill, and caution.”219 However, there are additional overlays for “prudence” in 
the investment of trust assets. Because trust assets are becoming increasingly 
financialized, two questions frequently arise: what are the parameters for the 
delegation of trust functions, and what are the requirements for the investment 
of trust assets? As to the first question, the modern trend is to permit the 
delegation of essential investment functions.220 As to the second, the modern 
trend is also more permissive. The conservative “prudent man rule,” which 
emphasizes preservation of trust funds and derivation of income221 and at one 
time shied away from stock,222 has been supplanted by the “prudent investor 
standard,” which evaluates risk not in isolation but on a portfolio basis.223 The 
new standard incorporates the Modern Portfolio Theory to confront, and even 
embrace, financial risk, so long as it is properly diversified.224
A breach of fiduciary duty can be remedied by damages, known as a 
“surcharge,” against the offending trustee.225 Surcharges can take the form of 
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lost profits226 or appreciation damages,227 and they can be imposed if the trust 
suffers no loss228 or if the trustee makes no profit.229 Where the duty of loyalty 
has been abrogated, courts often mete out damages that overcompensate an 
aggrieved principal, so as to deter errant agents.230 This is, in part, because 
self-dealing and other disloyal behavior is so difficult to uncover.
b. Redistributive Reforms
Empirical questions will dictate how fiduciary duties can be reconfigured 
for redistribution. Trustees are diverse, as are beneficiaries. Family members 
and friends are often called upon to serve as trustees; what they lack in 
investment expertise, they redeem in awareness of settlor and beneficiary 
dynamics.231 Of course, with the financialization of trust assets, settlors are 
looking to professional trustees with greater frequency. Even then, however, it 
can be difficult to discern the relative wealth of trustees and beneficiaries.232
For the above reasons, it cannot be said that a blanket prohibition on 
contracting out of fiduciary duties serves distributive ends efficiently. There 
may well be normative reasons for resisting the evisceration of trustee fiduciary 
duties.233 From a welfare economics perspective, however, fiduciary duties are 
too indeterminate to justify a wholesale assault on or defense of the 
contractarian trend.234 In other words, we cannot confidently claim that holding 
trustees to inflexible duties of care, loyalty, and good faith adequately shifts 
wealth from rich to poor. Nor can we confidently claim the opposite—that 
allowing those duties to be waived is an effective means of redistribution.
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Unexpectedly, the modern trend in the Third Restatement may strike the 
right balance: authorize the delegation of investment functions,235 but discipline 
the wayward trustee with lost-profit damages.236 With this combination, 
investment professionals are likelier to assume the helm; yet their violations of 
duty trigger damages that transfer wealth back to beneficiaries.
If professional trustees are wealthier on average than trust beneficiaries, 
then additional modifications can be made. Rather than reinstating a prudent 
man standard or prohibiting waivers on fiduciary duty (which would divert 
wealth from lay trustees to beneficiaries), fiduciary law could hold professional 
trustees to a higher standard.237 Additionally, lost profits could be awarded more 
liberally—for example, to remedy breaches of the duty of care in addition to the 
duty of loyalty.238 Finally, the causal link for damages could be relaxed. The 
current view adopts a proximate cause analysis to surcharging trustees: if losses 
would have occurred in the absence of a breach of trust—say, because the entire 
market moved downward, not just the portfolio’s investments—then the causal 
link is severed.239 This view effectively treats breach of fiduciary duty as a tort, 
which in corporate law has been controversial for its burdens on shareholder-
plaintiffs.240
3. Beneficiaries Versus Beneficiaries: Abatement, Ademption, Cy Pres,
and Execution Formalities
Rules that govern relations among beneficiaries comprise a fourth category 
of rules in trusts and estates. These rules perform a variety of functions, but 
overall, they work to resolve ambiguities in wills and trust instruments. This 
Subpart utilizes abatement, ademption, cy pres, and execution formalities to 
explore the redistributive potential of this category of rules.241
                                                                                                                     
235 See supra note 220.
236 See supra notes 225–30 and accompanying text.
237 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (“[I]f 
the trustee has a greater degree of skill than that of a man of ordinary prudence, he is liable 
for a loss resulting from the failure to use such skill as he has.”). This view was not wholly 
rejected by the UTC. See UNIF. TR. CODE § 804 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (“This 
section appropriately bases the standard on the purposes and other circumstances of the 
particular trust.”); id. § 806; see also UNIF. PRUDENT INV’R ACT § 2(f) (2006).
238 On the traditional reluctance to do so, see, for example, In re Estate of Janes, 681 
N.E.2d 332, 339 (N.Y. 1997).
239 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 205 cmt. f.
240 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 367 (Del. 1993) (holding that 
requiring proof that breach of care proximately caused shareholder losses is contrary to 
well-established Delaware precedent on a plaintiff’s burden of proof in duty of care cases).
241 This list is not exhaustive of the category. We could also add other rules such as (i) 
incorporation by reference, which determines whether devises made without testamentary 
formalities (e.g., written on a separate notebook) are part of the general scheme of 
distribution, see UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-510 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); and (ii) lapse, which 
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Using these rules to effectuate redistribution is likely to attract the criticism
of haphazardness in two ways.242 First, redistribution unfolds only when certain 
ambiguities plague wills, and then only among the beneficiaries who are 
implicated.243 Second, the rules may effectuate wrong-way redistribution that 
favors the well off and exacerbates inequality.244
a. Background
One subset within this category is rules of construction triggered by 
ambiguities in “devises,” or bequests. Abatement, for example, occurs when a 
testator’s estate is too small to satisfy all devises. Rules of abatement establish 
a hierarchy for satisfying devises unless a will provides otherwise.245 During 
probate, the court classifies all devises—bequests of a specifically described 
item are “specific,” bequests paid out of the estate’s general assets are “general,”
and all other bequests in a will are “residuary.”246 The rules typically stipulate 
that residuary devises “abate” (i.e., are extinguished or reduced pro rata) first, 
then general devisees, and finally specific devises.247 Hence, the order of 
abatement protects specific devises. Yet the order can be altered to meet policy 
objectives. At least one legislature has determined that devises to spouses enjoy 
first priority, so that they abate after specific devises.248
Ademption proceeds in the reverse order, so that specific devises are 
extinguished first. If a specifically devised asset is not found in the estate, then 
the devise has “adeemed” (failed).249 However, two alternatives enable the 
specific devisee to take something nonetheless. First, state law can construe
ademption narrowly, permitting beneficiaries to inherit the value of an 
extinguished devise unless the will provides otherwise.250 Second, when one 
                                                                                                                     
determines whether a devise to a beneficiary who has passed away before the decedent must 
fail or go to alternate takers, see id. § 2-603.
242 Haphazardness is a criticism of legal rules found throughout the double distortion 
literature. See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, Less Efficient, supra note 15, at 674–75.
243 See Sanchirico, supra note 15, at 1051 (“[One] potential objection to redistribution 
by private-law rules begins with the assertion that the redistributive event in the private law 
is random rather than periodic, and narrowly focused rather than broad-based.”).
244 Id. at 1055.
245 See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-902; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 145, at 250–51.
246 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 5.1 (AM. LAW INST. 1999); MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 145, at 340–41. This excludes 
demonstrative devises, which exhibit a blend of specific and general traits. MCGOVERN ET
AL., supra note 145, at 341.
247 MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 145, at 351.
248 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.436 (2014).
249 See UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-606, 2-609; MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 145, at 341–
42.
250 This is the result in jurisdictions that have adopted the Uniform Probate Code. See
UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-606.
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beneficiary is pitted against another, a probate court can classify ademption and 
specific devises narrowly or broadly to favor the more sympathetic 
beneficiary.251
Finally, a devise to a charitable organization can be frustrated if the 
organization becomes defunct. To fulfill a generalized philanthropic intent, 
courts invoke the cy pres doctrine to transfer the bequest to another charity.252
Cy pres enables redirecting trust funds to alternate institutions,253 modifying 
trusts to work around tax law changes,254 and eliminating racial and religious 
restrictions in devises.255 As a type of equitable power to modify trusts, cy pres
can apply to a plethora of situations, though some scholars assert that it is not 
utilized enough.256 More than the other rules of construction, an aggressive use 
of cy pres should not encounter widespread opposition because it likely achieves 
both donor intent and efficiency.257
The other subset within the category of rules governing inter-beneficiary 
relations pertains to will execution formalities.258 Every state sets forth 
formalities that must be met when a will is executed (e.g., how a will should be
signed and witnessed). These strictures date to the medieval Statute of Wills259
and perform four key functions of wills.260 Yet, punctilious as they may seem, 
formalities do yield to other considerations. Formalities can bend for 
holographic and electronic wills, where other indicia of authenticity exist and 
courts take liberties to avoid the alternative of intestacy.261 Even more 
                                                                                                                     
251 See, e.g., McGee v. McGee, 413 A.2d 72, 76–77 (R.I. 1980).
252 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 399 (AM. LAW INST. 1959) (“[I]f the 
settlor manifested a more general intention to devote the [trust] property to charitable 
purposes, the trust will not fail but the court will direct the application of the property to 
some charitable purpose which falls within the general charitable intention of the settlor.”); 
MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 145, at 445–50.
253 See In re Estate of Crawshaw, 819 P.2d 613, 620 (Kan. 1991).
254 See UNIF. TR. CODE § 416 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010).
255 See Howard Sav. Inst. of Newark, N.J. v. Peep, 170 A.2d 39, 48 (N.J. 1961); Coffee 
v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 408 S.W.2d 269, 274–75 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
256 See LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 129 (1955).
257 See POSNER, supra note 134, at 546.
258 See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 145, at 197–228.
259 See Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. 8, c.1 (1540) (Eng.); see also MCGOVERN ET AL., supra
note 145, at 197–228.
260 Namely, the protective, channeling, evidentiary, and ritual functions. See
MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 145, at 198–99.
261 “Holographic wills are wholly handwritten by the testator.” Id. at 212; see, e.g., Zhao 
v. Wong, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 707, 710 (1995). Electronic wills are created, signed, and/or 
executed on an electronic medium. See, e.g., In re Estate of Castro, No. 2013ES00140 
(Lorain Cty., Ohio Ct. Com. Pl., Prob. Div. June 19, 2013).
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unsettling, courts can play up or minimize the failure to abide by execution 
formalities to arrive at the natural outcomes.262
b. Redistributive Reforms
Rules of construction and execution formalities can facilitate redistribution 
in two ways: through broad, ex ante prescriptions by legislatures or through 
specific decisions by courts during ex post litigation. An example of wholesale 
legislative reform is the adjustment to abatement priorities favoring surviving 
spouses.263 Yet it is hard to imagine another interest group either powerful 
enough or sympathetic enough to successfully lobby for such a carve-out. 
Moreover, in the abstract, inter-beneficiary rules are likely to be 
indeterminate—that is, it cannot be generalized that one type of beneficiary is 
sufficiently wealthier that we should set applicable rules to a default position 
that transfers wealth away from these beneficiaries. Doing so may lead to 
wrong-way distribution in which the winners were wealthier than the losers 
from the outset.264
The other way to redistribute by these rules is through courts in probate and 
trust litigation. Where a will is ambiguous or its execution ceremony deficient, 
courts could construe rules to benefit the economically worse-off party. In an 
ademption setting, a court could classify as general (instead of specific) those 
devises to the poorer beneficiary. If a devise to a charitable organization failed,
a court exercising cy pres power might consider the relative economic stations 
of the will’s residuary beneficiaries versus the populations who would be served 
if the devise passed to an alternate charity.
There is precedent of taking these liberties. Classification of devises is an 
imprecise endeavor; interpreting similarly drafted provisions, two courts could 
come out with diametrically opposed results.265 Some of the iconic cases on 
rules of construction result in beneficiaries who had been provided little to 
nothing under the will prevailing over beneficiaries who had already received 
much of the estate.266 Execution formalities, too, can bend to arrive at “just”
                                                                                                                     
262 In other words, outcomes that cohere with probate judges’ preconceptions of what 
most testators want—usually to take care of close family members. Leslie, supra note 44, at 
236.
263 See IOWA CODE ANN. § 633.436 (West 2014).
264 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 99, at 1375–76.
265 Compare Haslam v. Alvarez, 38 A.2d 158, 162 (R.I. 1944), with In re Estate of 
DeVoss, 474 N.W.2d 542, 545 (Iowa 1991).
266 See, e.g., Clark v. Greenhalge, 582 N.E.2d 949, 953 (Mass. 1991) (discussing a 
separate notebook of testatrix deemed incorporated by reference into the will so that a 
sentimental painting goes to testatrix’s friend rather than her nephew, who already received 
much of the estate); McGee v. McGee, 413 A.2d 72, 78 (R.I. 1980) (finding the devise of an
empty bank account to grandchildren, who already received stock, to be specific and 
therefore adeemed so that a friend of decedent could receive $20,000). Of course, this does 
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results.267 Finally, there is even an efficiency dimension to the cy pres doctrine, 
whose application tends to enhance the welfare of the many at the expense of a 
few beneficiaries.268 In each of these circumstances, if equity and efficiency 
justifications were replaced or supplemented with redistributive considerations, 
then these rules too could be enlisted in the struggle against inequality.
The attractiveness of these rules lies in their application. Courts can weigh 
the relative wealth of the beneficiaries on a case-by-case basis. The rules can 
also foster positive interactions among beneficiaries, prompting settlement or 
dialogue to resolve their differences.269 Yet here lies the vulnerability of the 
rules as well. These rules do not apply as broadly as tax laws, and they would 
only redistribute among the beneficiaries who are affected. Hence, their 
redistribution is haphazard—of random and limited effect.270 The retort to this 
criticism is that these rules are merely one facet of a broader strategy to overhaul 
all rules governing wealth. Small as their effect might be, they can fill gaps 
overlooked by the tax system as well as other rules.
Another criticism is that the redistributive burden will fall to the 
beneficiaries of testators who cannot afford expert draftsmen. Slipshod lawyers 
are more prone to committing the ambiguities and errors that trigger these rules, 
but the ultra rich do not hire such lawyers. The generic response to this 
observation, which is of little consolation, is that the tax system is also rife with 
loopholes.271 In this way, the rules approximate the tax system, where savvy 
lawyers and financial planners help the rich avoid taxation, leaving the burden 
to the rest of us.272 Legal rules, in other words, are not unique in this aspect. 
Like other lines of criticisms and counterarguments sampled in this Article, 
the exchanges explored above derive from the double distortion discourse over 
whether rules or taxes are better at redistribution. This discourse is not tailored 
enough to rules governing inter-beneficiary disputes to be useful for our 
purposes. These rules may well shift the redistributive burden to estates that 
cannot pay fancy lawyers, but they may also capture a segment of smaller estates 
                                                                                                                     
not necessarily mean that the prevailing beneficiaries are poorer overall than the losing 
beneficiaries.
267 See Leslie, supra note 44, at 274.
268 See POSNER, supra note 134, at 546.
269 See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 106, at 390 (“[Redistribution by rules] is more 
conducive to advancing objective goods such as self-respect, accomplishment and 
appropriate relationships; enhances the recipients’ valuation of the things they have been 
given; and may decrease both the givers’ opposition to the redistribution and the injury to 
their welfare.”). 
270 See supra notes 242–44 and accompanying text.
271 See Sanchirico, supra note 15, at 1013.
272 See Alan Rusbridger, Panama: The Hidden Trillions, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Oct. 27, 
2016), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/10/27/panama-the-hidden-trillions/ 
[https://perma.cc/9APW-M6MB] (“The economic system is, basically, that the rich and the 
powerful exited long ago from the messy business of paying tax . . . . They don’t pay tax 
anymore, and they haven’t paid tax for quite a long time.” (quoting Luke Harding, former 
correspondent for The Guardian)).
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that are overlooked by reforms to the RAP, APTs, and fiduciary duties. More 
holistically, all of these reforms should be integrated into a model that factors 
in concerns unique to the rules governing the transmission of wealth. The next 
Part undertakes this objective.
IV. ASSEMBLING A UNIFYING THEORY
This Article has proposed several reforms to the legal rules of trusts and 
estates to combat wealth inequality. Yet to assemble a truly unifying theory on 
the laws governing wealth, one that integrates trusts and estates with business 
law, several additional questions must be addressed. First, how should we 
tolerate doctrinal divergences in the laws governing the transmission of wealth 
versus the laws governing the generation of wealth? Second, should the legal 
rules of trusts and estates defer at all to notions of fairness? Third, how do the 
reform proposals rank in distributive efficiency?
A. Doctrinal Asymmetries and Spillover Effects
Several of the reforms explored in this Article will take trust law out of 
synchronization with business law. For instance, the proposed constraints on 
spendthrift and asset protection trusts are more aggressive than their analogs in 
corporate law regarding limited liability. This is in part because fraudulent 
conveyance and misrepresentation are too weak for distributive purposes in 
trusts and estates.273 Hence, if these proposals are adopted, we may see more 
tort creditor exceptions in trusts and estates than in corporate law.274 Similarly, 
proposals to raise duty of care standards and damages for breach do not align 
with corporate law, which confers directors and officers with substantive and 
procedural protections that encourage risk-taking.275
These asymmetries may produce spillover effects. One possibility is that 
business law will follow suit by bolstering creditor protections and tempering 
contractarianism. This would vitiate modern trends, but it is not wholly 
improbable that this would happen anyway given that concerns about inequality 
are prompting similar calls for reform in business law.276 After all, this is how 
law often changes: an early mover, venturing into unfamiliar terrain, ends up 
                                                                                                                     
273 See supra notes 158–59, 173 and accompanying text.
274 See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text. Again, the denial of remedy to 
involuntary creditors has troubled corporate commentators enough to propose constraining 
limited liability in business law as well. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 180, at 
1916–23.
275 In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124 (Del. Ch. 2009) 
(business judgment rule).
276 See supra notes 21–28 and accompanying text.
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prompting a paradigm shift.277 The opposite possibility is that the limited 
liability and fiduciary duty contractarianism of corporate law could rein in 
contrary trends in trusts, so that redistributive reforms would be short-lived.
Equally likely, the reforms may not spill over at all. Instead, the 
asymmetries may ossify, so that parallel doctrines in business law and trusts and 
estates end up treading different paths. After law, contract law (the basis for 
corporate law) and trust law evolved separately to begin with.278
Trust law exceptionalism has been the subject of intense debate for nearly a 
quarter-century.279 In 1998, Professors Hansmann and Mattei published a pair 
of articles arguing that trust law’s central contribution is its asset partitioning 
function.280 Partitioning enables assets to be pledged in separate bundles to 
different classes of creditors,281 a function that cannot be replicated by 
contract.282 The corollary—that fiduciary duties are a less convincing 
explanation for trust law’s distinctiveness, since they can be reproduced as a 
body of contracts—has proven to be far more controversial.283 Hansmann and 
Mattei’s thesis can be read as a variation on the “end of history” arguments that 
were circulating in the early post-Cold War era, when ebullient scholars 
predicted worldwide convergence in political systems,284 corporate law,285 and 
                                                                                                                     
277 Indeed, in trusts, contractarianism took off because of initial forays in corporate law, 
after which other fields followed suit. See generally John H. Langbein, The Contractarian 
Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625 (1995).
278 Leslie, supra note 233, at 73–76.
279 If you count the associated debate over whether trust law is contractarian, this history 
stretches back over a century. See Langbein, supra note 277, at 643–50 (chronicling the 
debate between Frederic Maitland and August Scott).
280 See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative 
Legal and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 438 (1998) [hereinafter Hansmann & 
Mattei, Functions of Trust Law]; Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, Trust Law in the United 
States: A Basic Study of Its Special Contribution, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 133, 133–34
(1998) [hereinafter Hansmann & Mattei, Trust Law in the U.S.].
281 Hansmann & Mattei, Functions of Trust Law, supra note 280, at 438.
282 Hansmann & Mattei, Trust Law in the U.S., supra note 280, at 133–34.
283 See, e.g., Thomas P. Gallanis, The Contribution of Fiduciary Law, in THE WORLDS 
OF THE TRUST, supra note 194, at 388, 392–97 (criticizing the notion that contract could 
replace trust fiduciary law); Leslie, supra note 233, at 69 (“[I]t is a long leap from the 
proposition that fiduciary duties can be tailored to further individual objectives to the 
conclusion that fiduciary duties are merely gap-filling default rules . . . .”); Robert H. Sitkoff, 
Trust Law as Fiduciary Governance Plus Asset Partitioning, in THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST,
supra note 194, at 428, 444 (“For persons wishing to create a trust, the existence of trust 
fiduciary law provides a ready-made web of rules and standards to govern the trustee’s 
exercise of the trustee’s discretionary powers of administration. . . . [T]he rules are market-
mimicking defaults, which economizes on transaction costs.”). 
284 See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN, at xi (1992).
285 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Essay, The End of History for Corporate 
Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439 (2001).
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apparently trusts and enterprise organization.286 In another sense, however, their 
thesis is a continuation of the attempt by scholars to read contractarianism—or, 
as Professor Langbein would argue, to re-read contractarianism—into trusts 
law.287 Either way, the central question is whether trusts law is distinct enough 
to merit its divergence from trends in corporate law. Answering “no” are the 
contractarians.288 Answering “yes” are scholars who emphasize trust law’s
moral content,289 unique history and dynamics,290 and the primacy it places 
upon fiduciary duties.291
This Article embraces a more functional approach to trust law 
exceptionalism. It takes no position on whether trusts are grounded in moral 
obligation or unique history. Instead, this Article hitches the field’s claim of 
uniqueness to utilitarianism—that is, trust law is unique because it has to be
unique. Given the gravity of inequality’s consequences and the inability of 
wealth transfer taxes to counteract inequality, trusts and estates’ legal rules must 
step in, even if it fosters inconsistencies in doctrines shared with business law.
B. Fairness Versus Welfare
If the law were only to serve distributive ends, its results would defy our 
sense of fairness.292 Fairness encompasses justice, equity, rights, and related 
concepts; under the technical formulation of Professors Kaplow and Shavell, 
fairness is everything that is not welfare.293 Welfare, meanwhile, is shorthand 
                                                                                                                     
286 See Hansmann & Mattei, Functions of Trust Law, supra note 280, at 479 (“We are 
left, then, with the question whether the differences between [trusts and corporations] are in 
any way fundamental, or whether the roles now served by these two forms could both be 
served as well by a single legal form that by itself imposes little beyond the asset partitioning 
that is their lowest common denominator . . . .”).
287 Langbein argued that the contractarian basis was in trusts all along, though Scott took 
the field on a tangent. See Langbein, supra note 277, at 644. This idea had precursors. See 
generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (putting forth the 
idea that corporate law mimics the set of contracts at which principals would arrive if there 
were no transaction costs); FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1996) (building on Coase’s theory of the corporation). The 
trust-law-as-default-rules analysis was extended in Sitkoff, supra note 194, at 630 
(explaining that trust law lets the settlor and trustee focus exclusively on their deviations 
from the default governance scheme). For a law and economics analysis of trusts more 
broadly, see generally Kelly, supra note 5, at 1160.
288 E.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Freedom of Testation/Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV.
2180, 2181–82 (2011); Langbein, supra note 277, at 660.
289 E.g., Leslie, supra note 233, at 70.
290 E.g., Deborah S. Gordon, Trusting Trust, 63 U. KAN. L. REV. 497, 502–03 (2015);
Leslie, supra note 233, at 70.
291 E.g., Gallanis, supra note 283, at 397. Gallanis also argues that fiduciary duties 
cannot easily be replicated by contract.
292 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 99, at 971.
293 See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 18, at 38–41.
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for social welfare, which is the aggregation of every individual’s well-being in 
society.294 Over a decade ago, Professors Kaplow and Shavell asserted 
provocatively that the law should only serve welfare, disregarding fairness 
altogether.295 As expected, this austere endorsement of utilitarianism was 
denounced by scholars who argue that law should at least partially reflect moral 
norms.296 One recurring criticism among the detractors has been that fairness 
better captures our preferences than welfare; hence, the welfare calculus should 
make room for noneconomic considerations such as fairness.297
In trusts and estates, normative principles are so deeply embedded that a 
single-minded pursuit of redistribution would be scorned. The overriding 
principle in the field is testamentary freedom,298 which so dominates 
conceptions of fairness that limiting principles are exceedingly rare.299 This is 
not to suggest, though, that testamentary freedom cannot be abridged on equity 
grounds. For example, Professor Leslie has shown that courts can bend will 
formalities to ensure that surviving family members are provided for, regardless 
of whether the testator’s will does so.300 Apart from testamentary freedom, 
fiduciary duties too are pregnant with moral and ethical obligations.301
The normative vocabulary—or, if we adopt Kaplow and Shavell’s succinct 
definition, fairness—therefore pervades trusts and estates. Consequently, the 
reduction of beneficiary–beneficiary relations (i.e., the fourth category of legal 
rules) to a distributive function would surely offend our sense of fairness. 
Testamentary intent would be routinely vitiated. Poor beneficiaries might be 
viewed as receiving a windfall if they had led a life of inebriation or sloth or 
                                                                                                                     
294 Id. at 24–28.
295 Id. at 27–28.
296 On the placement of Kaplow and Shavell’s argument within the deontic-utilitarian 
debate, see Coleman, supra note 100, at 1512. On how Kaplow and Shavell fit into the 
consequentialist and welfare spectrum, see Christopher P. Taggart, Fairness Versus Welfare:
The Limits of Kaplow and Shavell’s Pareto Argument, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 661, 702 (2016).
297 Farnsworth, supra note 206, at 2015–18. Curiously, the efficiency-only position 
seems to have been rejected long ago in the welfare economics literature on which Kaplow 
and Shavell base their argument. See FLEURBAEY & MANIQUET, supra note 18, at xv (citing 
KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963)).
298 See Sitkoff, supra note 46, at 643. Note, however, that testamentary freedom and 
fairness do not always align.
299 See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 716 (1987) (“[T]he right to pass on property—to 
one’s family in particular—has been part of the Anglo-American legal system since feudal 
times. . . . [T]otal abrogation of the right to pass property is unprecedented and likely 
unconstitutional.” (citation omitted)). For this reason, the limitations on testamentary power 
are themselves limited. See MCGOVERN ET AL., supra note 145, at 133–36. Certainly 
inequality-based justifications have previously met with little success, due to the reliance on 
progressive taxation. See id. at 133.
300 See Leslie, supra note 44, at 274. More recently, Professor Glover has explicated the 
field’s seemingly inconsistent regulation of inheritance from a social welfare perspective. 
See Glover, supra note 16. 
301 See Leslie, supra note 233, at 90.
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treated the testator badly. As it turns out, society willingly tolerates economic 
disparities that are attributable to differences of effort.302 Thus, rather than 
blithely transferring wealth from rich to poor, our policies of equality tend to 
either level the playing field for fair competition or impair our ability to 
discriminate on the basis of traits that are unconnected to merit.303 To the extent 
that our well-being is enhanced by the law’s pursuit of these notions of 
fairness,304 and to the extent that unconditional wealth transfers strike us as 
unfair, overemphasis on redistribution in all circumstances would be cavalier.
The path to a unifying theory therefore cannot completely disregard 
fairness. The strategy must be to “weaken fairness requirements until they 
capture basic, sensible, and perhaps context-specific ethical objectives that are 
compatible with efficiency requirements.”305 Of course, more work must be 
done on the extent to which fairness should defer to welfare. Once the proper 
balance is struck, we can turn to the equally complicated task of devising 
feasible policy.306
C. Distributive Efficiency
If we were to construct a hierarchy on the distributive efficiency of the 
reforms explored in this Article, the RAP and exceptions to APTs would occupy 
the top rung. In combination, dynasty trusts and APTs have permitted settlors 
to squirrel away some trillions of dollars.307 Dynasty trust and APT reform are 
attractive in that distribution would emanate from the very wealthy. Where these 
rules intersect with the tax system, there is the additional benefit that 
distributions can flow to the weighted priorities built into public programs—
                                                                                                                     
302 Succinctly put, “[t]he contrasts among American families in living standards and in 
material wealth reflect a system of rewards and penalties that is intended to encourage effort 
and channel it into socially productive activity.” OKUN, supra note 75, at 1. For a summary 
of how this thread has permeated the welfarist literature since Rawls, see John E. Roemer & 
Alain Trannoy, Equality of Opportunity, in 2A HANDBOOK OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION 217, 
220–29 (Anthony B. Atkinson & François Bourguignon eds., 2015).
303 See JOHN E. ROEMER, EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY 1–2 (1998).
304 See Coleman, supra note 100, at 1514 (criticizing the Kaplow–Shavell approach as 
“tautological” and “underdeveloped”); Farnsworth, supra note 206, at 2016 (describing 
fairness as part of a welfarist strategy). 
305 FLEURBAEY & MANIQUET, supra note 18, at 235.
306 Complications include setting the right incentives to get the parties involved to 
communicate their preferences (economic and noneconomic) to judges and lawmakers, as 
well as the political feasibility of deviations from the status quo. See id. at 236.
307 See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 68, at 404 & n.125 (noting that, as of 2003, 
an estimated $100 billion in trust assets were moved due to the abolition of the RAP in certain 
states); Rusbridger, supra note 272 (citing economist Gabriel Zucman, and discussing $7.6 
trillion in wealth which is deposited in tax havens globally). For an account of one creditor’s 
foray into the world of offshore APTs, see Nicholas Confessore, How To Hide $400 Million,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/30/magazine/how-to-hide-
400-million.html (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
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assuming that we trust the government with adequately weighting its 
distribution for maximum redistributive efficacy.308
Yet we should not abandon redistribution at the more granular level of inter-
beneficiary relations. The fourth category of trusts and estates’ rules might only 
transfer wealth between two discrete parties affected by litigation. Nonetheless, 
as part of a holistic model integrating the tax system, business law, and other 
rules in trusts and estates, inter-beneficiary distributions capture what the other 
schemes omit. Put metaphorically, if every bucket has holes, then water (i.e., 
wealth) is best caught by nesting buckets together with different holes.309 In this 
rubric, even “weakly redistributive” results that transfer wealth between discrete 
parties in litigation can play a role.310
Legitimately, critics might denounce wealth transfer schemes premised 
upon litigation as inefficient because the fail to provide clear ex ante
prescriptions and instead incentivize lawsuits.311 Yet from the standpoint of 
administrative efficiency, probate judges have insights into the preferences and 
relative wealth of the relevant parties at a level of intimacy that administrative 
agencies do not.312 From the standpoint of feasibility, wholesale transfers 
crafted by legislatures may simply be impossible.
Within this distributive efficiency rubric, fiduciary duties sit somewhere in 
the middle, between the RAP and APTs on one end and rules of construction 
and execution facilities on the other. Reforms to fiduciary duties are likelier to 
be more indeterminate.313 On these points, and also the design of empirical 
research to address redistributive indeterminacy, future work must follow.
                                                                                                                     
308 Welfare economics can pursue a variety of allocations. For instance, an allocation 
can give absolute priority to the worst-off member of a society. However, imagine the 
following hypothetical: the absolute worst-off member has a utility measurement of 8.9, 
1000 people comprising the next worse-off group measure at 9.1, and the other 1000 
members of society measure at 100. Absolute priority to the worst off overlooks the next 
worse off. It is up to policymakers to derive a priority that weighs these considerations 
appropriately. See Roger Crisp, Equality, Priority, and Compassion, 113 ETHICS 745, 752–
55 (2003) (citing THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 125 (1979)); see also FLEURBAEY &
MANIQUET, supra note 18, at 39–45.
309 See Sanchirico, supra note 15, at 1007. For more technical explanations, see 
FLEURBAEY & MANIQUET, supra note 18, at 45.
310 I borrow the “weakly redistributive” terminology from the welfarist conception of 
“weak Pareto efficiency,” in which one allocation is better than another if each of the relevant 
actors prefers it. FLEURBAEY & MANIQUET, supra note 18, at 8.
311 See Mark L. Ascher, The 1990 Uniform Probate Code: Older and Better, or More 
Like the Internal Revenue Code?, 77 MINN. L. REV. 639, 641 (1993) (decrying litigation 
incentives in the Uniform Probate Code).
312 Agencies cannot achieve this intimacy of knowledge without adding to their already 
sizeable costs. As a general matter, the administrative costs of determining and implementing 
optimal distributions might “dwarf any benefit.” Kaplow & Shavell, Favor the Poor?, supra
note 15, at 832. Administrative and compliance costs are frequently unaccounted for in the 
double distortion argument. See Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note 15, at 12–13. 
313 See supra notes 233–34 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
This Article lays the foundation for a theory of inequality that unifies laws 
regulating the generation and transmission of wealth. It also evaluates the 
redistributive potential of the legal rules within trusts and estates. With proper 
justification, the goal of welfare enhancement can overcome the field’s
entrenched notions of fairness such as freedom of testation. This Article proffers 
the perils of inequality as such a justification, perils severe enough to also merit 
doctrinal divergences between business law and trusts and estates law.
Further work is needed to resolve the distributive indeterminacy of the rules. 
Empirical research in particular could establish a ranking of the distributive 
efficiency of reforms proposed in this Article. Notwithstanding such a ranking, 
the best result may be all-encompassing, nesting the weakly redistributive 
mechanisms within more sweeping ones.
The ultimate goal is to harness the redistributive potential of trusts and 
estates. Much of the law and economics discourse on redistribution by legal 
rules unfolds abstractly,314 with boilerplate defenses arguing that the tax system 
is just as difficult to administer as legal rules and just as susceptible to forum 
selection.315 Similarly, welfare economics can quickly descend into obscure 
theorems and mathematical proofs.316 Welfare economics and law and 
economics provide the framework, but the content must be filled out by diving 
into the rules, norms, and efficiencies of the specific context. Hopefully, this 
Article will be the beginning of a larger movement to do so within trusts and 
estates.
                                                                                                                     
314 For instance, Kaplow and Shavell popularized the exploration of fairness versus 
welfare through abstract tort-law hypotheticals. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 99, at 
1052. In turn, critics have responded with abstract hypotheticals from other areas of law. See, 
e.g., Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note 15, at 19.
315 See, e.g., Blumkin & Margalioth, supra note at 15, at 2. 
316 For a valiant attempt to keep the proofs simple, see FLEURBAEY & MANIQUET, supra
note 18, at 39–45.
